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Abstract
Three Essays on International Mobility and Economic Development
Imran Arif
This dissertation contains research on three topics in economic development. The main
argument of this dissertation is that when societies interact they learn new ideas, superior
technologies, and new production processes from each other. Any barriers to this interaction
can hurt the diffusion of ideas across nations. Chapter 1 features a neglected channel of
institution convergence among countries, i.e., international travel. International travel clearly
increases human interaction over space and exposes societies to foreign influences, foreign
ideas, and foreign institutions. Does international travel promote institutional change in a
traveler’s home country? This paper uses panel data on 149 countries from 1995-2012 to
test the hypothesis of institutional convergence among countries stemming from international
travel. Our instrumental variable results indicate that institutions are very persistent over
time and that international travel itself is not a significant determinant of institution quality
in the home country. However, institutional quality in host countries visited by travelers has
a significant effect on home country institutions, and this effect increases with the number
of travelers. In the system GMM settings, we do find evidence for institutional convergence
among countries. Chapter 2 investigates whether foreign qualified students bring new ideas
and technical expertise from abroad, disperse them, and stimulate aggregate productivity
in their home countries. An instrumental variable is derived from a fitted gravity equation
model. An unbalanced panel data of 111 countries during the period 1950-2012 shows that
foreign education has a statistically significant effect on technology diffusion. The results
are robust across different sub-samples and to the inclusion of other channels of technology
diffusion. These findings should prove helpful to policy makers in developing economies to
adopt more open education policies and to increase public spending on foreign education.
Chapter 3 tests the relationship between barriers to international mobility and technology
diffusion. Barriers to international mobility are the critical factors to impede the process of
international technology diffusion. Using bilateral visa restrictions data from 30 host and
198 home countries over the period of 2001-2012, this paper shows that the international
technology gap increases as the barriers to international mobility increase. These results
are robust across three different measures of visa restrictions and even after taking care of
econometric problem of endogeneity. The results suggest that visa facilitation programs by
advanced countries could promote international technology diffusion.
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Chapter 1
International Flows of People and
Institutional Convergence
This paper features a neglected channel of institution convergence among countries, i.e.,
international travel. International travel clearly increases human interaction over space and
exposes societies to foreign influences, foreign ideas, and foreign institutions. Does inter-
national travel promote institutional change in a traveler’s home country? This paper uses
panel data on 149 countries from 1995-2012 to test the hypothesis of institutional conver-
gence among countries stemming from international travel. Our instrumental variable results
indicate that institutions are very persistent over time and that international travel itself is
not a significant determinant of institution quality in the home country. However, institu-
tional quality in host countries visited by travelers has a significant effect on home country
institutions, and this effect increases with the number of travelers. In the system GMM
settings, we do find evidence for institutional convergence among countries.
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1.1 Introduction
People travel abroad for a variety of reasons: vacation, business, academic, religious work,
performing athletic or artistic work, medical treatment, etc. These travelers are exposed to
foreign influences, foreign ideas, and foreign institutions. Does this exposure help them
improve institutions in their home countries? In order to explore the statistical relation-
ship between institutions and temporary cross border travel, this study follows Spilimbergo
(2009), Glaeser et al. (2007), Acemoglu et al. (2005), La Porta et al. (1999), and Barro (1999)
and features an institution quality index as a dependent variable. The baseline specification
follows Spilimbergo (2009) and includes three explanatory variables: international travel as a
share of population, average institutions in host countries, and an interaction term between
the two. The average institutions in host countries variable captures the idea that travelers
experience different types of institutions in different countries, and hence bring back differ-
ent institutional knowledge from abroad. For example, an international traveler experiences
different type of institutions in Saudi Arabia than in the U.S. The interaction term shows
whether the marginal effect of international travel depends on the institutions in the host
countries. We use the well-known Polity IV index as a primary dependent variable, and test
the robustness of the results by using two additional measures of political institutions: a
political rights index and a civil liberties index.1
International travel is likely to be endogenous in the model. Countries with better quality
institutions may show more travel intensity due to reasons unrelated to institutions. To deal
with this endogeneity, we construct an instrument for international travel by estimating a
bilateral travel gravity equation containing bilateral geographic factors. These geographic
factors are distinct from those effecting institutions directly.2 The estimated values of the
bilateral travel equation are then summed up to calculate aggregate predicted travel values,
and used as an instrument for the international travel. In using a bilateral travel equation
as an instrument for the international flows of people, we are following the work of Andersen
and Dalgaard (2011) and Spilimbergo (2009).
1Polity IV is a widely used measure of political institutions in cross-country literature. See, for example,
Leeson (2008), Leeson and Dean (2009), Sobel and Coyne (2011), and Dutta et al. (2013).
2We further discuss the validity of these instruments in section 1.4.5.
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We use an annual unbalanced panel of 149 countries from 1995-2012 to estimate the rela-
tionship between institutions and international travel. Our two-stage least squares estimates
show that (1) institutions are very persistent over time, (2) there is no direct evidence that
international travel, as a share of population, is a significant determinant of institution qual-
ity in the country of origin, (3) institutions in the host countries have a significant effect on
home country institutions, and (4) the marginal effect of average institutions in host coun-
tries is positive and increases with the number of travelers. The results are almost consistent
across three measures of political institutions: the Polity IV index, the political rights index,
and the civil liberties index. These results show that there is little support of institutional
convergence among countries via international flows of people. Although, our results in the
system GMM settings are not consistent with OLS and two-stage least squares, but we do
find evidence for institutional convergence among countries.
Our paper adds to the literature in that we explore the effects of international flows
of people on home country institutions. Earlier research primarily focuses on the impact of
emigration on development and democracy in the country of origin. Spilimbergo (2009) is an
exception as he analyzes the effects of foreign educated individuals on the level of democracy
in the home country. However, Spilimbergo (2009) focuses on a specific group of cross-border
travelers, tertiary level international students. Here we are able to look at all international
travelers who stayed in another country for less than a year.
We expect our results to further expand upon the insights of Spilimbergo (2009) for four
reasons. First, most people travel to other countries for non-academic reasons. We might,
therefore, expect that non-academic international travelers might have a larger effect on
their home country institutions given that they comprise a larger share of the home country
population. Second, the majority of international students belong to the elite of their country
(Spilimbergo, 2009). These students may be more interested in the status quo in their home
countries. This may be due to the political and economic rents that the elite accrue from
the status quo (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). Ordinary citizens, on the other hand, can
directly gain from changing the political system in the home country. Third, students, while
their time in the host country, spend most of their time on-campus and they may be too busy
studying and have a little time to take interest in host country politics. Ordinary citizens,
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however, travel to other countries for personal and business reasons and are likely to have
more direct interaction or discussion regarding host country political institutions. Fourth,
and perhaps most pragmatic, is the element of time. The data set on international tertiary
level students contains students who cross national borders to study outside their country
of citizenship for more than a year, while our international travel data set contains data for
international travelers who stayed in another country for less than a year.
In addition to the literature on student flows, our paper relates to two other important
topics in the institutional literature. First, our paper clearly relates to the literature ex-
ploring the relationship between migration and home country institutions. For example,
Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) and Dustmann et al. (2011) find that migrants accu-
mulate knowledge in foreign countries, and return migrants use this knowledge for economic
expansion in the home country. Docquier and Rapoport (2012), Beine et al. (2001), and
Mountford (1997) explore the effects of brain drain in the home country. Li et al. (2016) an-
alyze the impact of migration on both economic and political institutions. They argue that
migration has a direct effect on the human capital and thus on institutional development in
the home country. Their findings suggest that brain drain has a positive effect on political
institutions and a negative effect on economic institutions. Docquier et al. (2010) split mi-
gration data into two parts: skilled and unskilled migrants. They find that both openness
to migration and human capital has a positive effect on institutions in the home country,
unskilled migration improves institutional quality, and brain drain has an ambiguous effect.
Second, our work relates to a smaller, emerging literature on institutional convergence (Elert
and Halvarsson, 2012; Heckelman and Young, 2014; Hall, 2016).
We organize our paper as follows: section 1.2 explores how does international travel
affect institutions, section 1.3 presents trends in international travel, section 1.4 describes
our empirical strategy, a description of our data, and regression results, and section 1.5
concludes.
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1.2 How does International Travel Affect Institutions?
So, how does international travel affect institutions in the home country? Before turning
to the channels through which international travel may affect institutions, it is worthwhile to
define institutions, why they are important, how they emerge, and then relate international
travel with institutions. North (1990) states that, “institutions are the rules of the game in a
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction,”
and refers to them as critical determinants of economic development. Similarly, Acemoglu
et al. (2002) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that institutions shape the society
and provide a framework for economic growth by reducing uncertainty.
Better quality institutions comprise of well-defined property rights and the rule of law.
Economic activity flourishes in the environment of better quality institutions, people have
an incentive to invest in physical capital, human capital, technology, and innovation (Glaeser
et al., 2004). Who would invest in a country without the rule of law and without a political
and judicial system that respects property rights? A political system that ensures property
rights performs better than a system with a high probability of expropriation. Given this,
institutions are considered a necessary condition for economic growth (Knack and Keefer,
1995; Acemoglu et al., 2002; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
Why do different institutions emerge in different countries and how does international
travel affect them? There are four popular views about the emergence of different institutions
in different countries: the efficient institution view, social conflict theory, the incidental view,
and the ideology view. According to the efficient institutions view, societies choose the type
of institutions that maximize their total surplus. Demsetz (1967) argues that societies enforce
property rights when the benefits of enforcing exceed the costs. Some societies may choose
not to enforce property rights because the net benefits are less than the costs.
Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that international human interaction increases inter-
national trade. Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) and Tani and Joyeux (2013) argue that
international travel increases productivity and technology diffusion in the home country.
This implies that international travel increases the total wealth of a country. An increase in
wealth increases the benefits of enforcing property rights relative to the costs, because (1)
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there is more wealth to protect from other individuals and the state and (2) the society can
better afford to enforce property rights. The notion that as societies become richer they can
afford to enforce property rights can be traced to North (1990) and Przeworski (2005).
According to social conflict theory, institutions emerge not as a choice by the whole
society, but by the groups holding the political power at that time. These groups choose
institutions which increase their own economic rents instead of maximizing the total surplus
of the whole society. International human interaction not only increases the income of the
home country, as stated above, but also exposes travelers to alternative institutions in other
countries. As a result of an increase in wealth, individuals gain more de facto political power,
which often results in an increase in the demand for better institutions. For example, Batista
and Vicente (2011) find evidence that migrants learn governance and accountability in the
host country, which helps to improve governance and accountability in their home countries.
International travelers may also increase the demand for better quality institutions in their
home countries. International travelers are in a better position to raise their voice, because
they have an option to leave their country and have access to the international community
and foreign media.
International travel has played a major role in developing and shaping the political
philosophies of many leaders. For example, Gandhi developed most of his political ideas
and leadership skills in South Africa (Power, 1969). According to some authors, even a
small minority can change the fate of the whole country. For example, Jones et al. (2005)
find evidence in favor of individual leaders having an effect on the economic development
of a country. Similarly, Spilimbergo (2009) argues that foreign educated leaders can change
the institutional structure of a country.
The ideology view of institutions suggests that societies may have different institutions
because they have different ideologies and beliefs. International travel may expose societies
to new ideologies and beliefs. Greater interaction with foreign ideologies and beliefs may
change the ideologies and beliefs of the home country.3 This change may provide roots
to reform the political institutions in the home country. Sheehan and Young (2015) find
3One recent unfortunate example of traveling and a change in belief is the Boston Marathon bombing
(2012) perpetrator, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who was radicalized while traveling to Russia.
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that greater interaction via the Internet increases institution quality. Similarly, Bergh et al.
(2014) finds that globalization has positive effects on institution quality.
While the previous three views of institutions argue that societies or some groups choose
institutions in a country, the incidental view of institutions suggests that institutions are
the by-product of other social interactions. For example, La Porta et al. (1999), Acemoglu
et al. (2002), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that institutions today depend on
the colonial history of a country. Many countries, today, have the same type of institutions
as their ex-colonizers. For example, the countries colonized by the British have a common-
law tradition and those colonized by the Spanish, such as Latin American countries, have
a civil-law tradition. La Porta et al. (1998) find that common-law, relative to French-law
and other law systems, is the best at protecting property rights. Similarly, Acemoglu and
Cantoni (2011) argue about the institutional reforms in Europe brought about by the French
Revolution and by Napoleon. While our paper cannot directly distinguish across these
channels, our results provide an important mechanism through which institutions evolve.
1.3 Trends in International Travel
International travel data show a strong increasing trend from 1995-2012 and is expected
to increase by 3.3 percent a year from 2010 to 2030 (World Tourism Organization, 2014).
About 1.60 billion people crossed international borders in 2012 compared to 0.85 billion in
1995. This shows an increase of 86 percent in the total number of international travelers
from 1995 to 2012. Figure 1.1 in the appendix shows a snap shot of the total number of
international travelers over the period 1995-2012. This figure shows an upward trend in the
number of international travelers; more people are crossing international borders today than
ever before.
Figure 1.2 represents the annual growth rate of international travel during 1995-2012.
The average annual growth rate of international travel is about 4.0 percent during 1995-
2012. Most of the years show a steady and positive growth in international travel. This
figure shows the highest growth rate of 10.3 percent in 2004 and the lowest growth rate of
-3.9 in 2009 (post-Great Recession). Figure 1.3 shows the top ten destination countries for
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international travelers. In 2012, France was the top destination country for international
travelers and hosted about 83 million visitors. France is followed by the U.S. and China,
each hosted 67 million and 57 million visitors, respectively. Other countries in this list
include Spain, Italy, Turkey, Germany, the U.K., Russia, and Malaysia. Figure 1.4 shows
top ten origin countries for international travel. This list includes the U.S. (27.6 million),
Germany (20 million), France (11.1 million), the UK (10.4 million), Russia (6.7 million),
Austria (4.9 million), China (4.8 million), Malaysia (4.4 million), Switzerland (4.3 million),
and the Netherlands (4.2 million).
International travel data also reveals that international mobility depends on the location
and income group of the home country. Figure 1.5 (see, also Table 1.9, and Table 1.10)
shows the regional distribution of international travelers during the period 1995-2012. In
2012, about 890 million travelers originated from Europe and Central Asia, 342 million from
East Asia and Pacific, 172 million from North America, 62 million from Latin America and
Caribbean, 63 million from the Middle East and North Africa, and about 24 million from
both South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. From 1995 to 2012, the travel share of Europe and
Central Asia decreased from 61 percent in 1995 to 56 percent in 2012 while the share of East
Asia and Pacific increased from 15 percent to 22 percent, the Middle East and North Africa
increased from 2.13 percent to 4 percent, Latin America and the Caribbean increased from
3.23 percent to about 4 percent, South Asia increased from 0.87 percent to 1.57 percent, and
for Sub-Saharan Africa increased from 1.33 percent to 1.52 percent.4 Overall, during 18 years
of sample period, about 59 percent of international travelers originated from Europe and
Central Asia, 18 percent from East Asia and Pacific, 13.3 from North America, 3.50 percent
from Latin America and Caribbean, 3.35 percent from Middle East and North Africa, 1.60
percent from Sub-Saharan Africa, and 1.20 percent from South Asia.
The distribution of international travel based on the income level of the home country also
shows the same dispersion. Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of international travel based
on the income level of the home country.5 In 1995, high income countries had the largest
share in international travel (about 90 percent), followed by upper middle income countries
4Table 1.10 shows the travel share of each region.
5Income group classifications are taken from WDI. The data for Figure 1.6 can be found in Table 1.11.
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(6.54 percent), lower middle income countries (3.16 percent), and low income countries (0.56
percent). From 1995 to 2012, the travel share decreased from 90 percent to 79 percent for
high income countries, increased from 6.54 percent to 14 percent for upper income countries,
increased from 3.16 percent to 6.30 percent for lower middle income countries, and increased
from 0.56 percent to 0.96 percent for low income countries. Travel share, during 18 years
of sample period, shows the same pattern. About 84.74 percent of international travelers
originated from high income countries, 9.59 percent from upper middle income countries, 4.84
percent from lower middle income countries, and 0.82 percent from low income countries.
This shows that citizens from some regions and high income group have an advantage in
international mobility, and they are more exposed to foreign influences, ideas and institutions.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Data
This paper uses an annual unbalanced panel of 149 countries from 1995-2012 to estimate
the relationship between institutions and international travel. This section briefly describes
our variables and data sources.
Travel: This variable shows the number of international outbound travelers as a share of
population from the home country and is denoted by Travel. The data for this variable are
taken from the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). UNWTO reports the annual
number of arriving and departing travelers who stayed in another country for less than a
year for business, leisure, and any other purpose. UNWTO reports the data of international
travelers in 12 different categories. The data series begins with 1995 and we construct the
variable Travel as the mean value across these 12 categories.
Polity IV Index: Polity IV is our primary measure of political institutions. Some
economists believe that the Polity index, compared to other measures of institutions, is a
better measure of institution quality. The argument is that it shows the constraint on the
executive while other measures of institutions are policy outcomes (Glaeser et al., 2004).
The Polity IV dataset covers all major and independent states over the period 1800-2012
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and reports polity scores on a scale ranging from -10 to 10, where 10 indicates a consolidated
democracy and -10 indicates an autocracy. Our paper, similar to other studies such as
Spilimbergo (2009) and Barro (1999), normalizes this index on a scale ranging from 0 to 1
for an easier interpretation, where 0 indicates low institution quality and 1 indicates high
quality institutions.
Political Rights Index: Political rights index shows the extent to which citizens of a
country enjoy free and fair elections, opposition parties are competitive and enjoy real power,
and minority groups have representation in the country. The data for this index are taken
from Freedom House. Freedom House reports this index on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, with
1 indicating a wide range of political rights and 7 indicating a few or no political rights. In
our analysis, we normalized this variable on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates
no political rights and 1 indicates a wide range of political rights.
Civil Liberties Index: Civil liberties index shows the extent to which citizens of a
country enjoy freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, religion, a fair legal
system to ensure rule of law, free economic activity, and equal opportunities for everyone.
This index is also reported by Freedom House on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating
a wide range of civil liberties and 7 indicating a few or no civil liberties. This index is also
normalized on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates no civil liberties and 1 indicates
a wide range of civil liberties.
Institutions in Host Countries: Institutions in host countries variable shows the
type of institutions travelers experience while traveling abroad. This variable is constructed
as the weighted average of institutions in host countries, where weights are given as the
share of total travelers to that host country over total international travelers from the home
country. The value of this index lies between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates that all international
travelers from the home country went to host countries with better quality institutions, and
0 indicates that all international travelers from the home country went to host countries
with low quality political institutions. Average institutional quality in the host countries is
calculated as
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Students: This variable shows the number of tertiary level international students (university
education and higher) as a share of population, and is denoted by Students. This variable
refers to students who cross national border to study outside their country of citizenship, or
are enrolled in a distance learning program abroad for more than a year. The data for this
variable are taken from UNESCO.
Other Control Variables: We also include Infant Mortality Rate—the number
of infants dying before reaching one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year—
Life Expectancy at Birth—the average number of years a newborn infant would live—
Urbanization Rate—the annual percentage growth rate of population living in the urban
areas—GDP per capita, Primary Education, and Population. The data for these variables
are taken from WDI. Data for geographic factors are taken from the well-known CEPII
database.
1.4.2 Baseline Specification
To test the statistical relationship between institution quality and the international flows
of people, this paper follows Spilimbergo (2009), Glaeser et al. (2007), Acemoglu et al.
(2005), La Porta et al. (1999), and Barro (1999) and uses an index of institution quality as
a dependent variable. The baseline specification follows Spilimbergo (2009) and estimates
the following regression equation
Insti,t = β0 Insti,t−5 + β1 ln(Traveli,t−5) + β2 Inst. in host countriesi,t−5
+ β3 ln(Traveli,t−5)
∗ Inst. in host countriesi,t−5
+ β4 Xi,t−5 + εi,t (1.2)
where Insti,t is the index of institution quality at time t in country i. Although the primary
dependent variable of this paper is the Polity IV index, this paper checks the robustness of
the regression results by using two additional dependent variables: the civil liberties index
and the political rights index. Other explanatory variables are ln(Travelt−5); the total
number of outbound travelers as a share of population, Inst. in host countriesi,t−5; the type
of institutions travelers experience in the host country, and the interaction term between the
two variables.
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Variable Inst. in host countriesi,t−5 shows the average institution quality in the host
countries. This variable is constructed as the weighted average of institutions in the host
countries where weights are given as the share of total travelers to that host country over
all international travelers from the home country.6 This index lies between 0 and 1, where
1 indicates that all international travelers went to the host countries with better quality
institutions, and 0 indicates that all international travelers went to the host countries with
weak institutions. The interaction term between Travel and Inst. in host countries captures
whether the marginal effect of international travel depends on the institutions in the host
countries. Xi,t−5 is a vector of control variables
7 and contains the number of tertiary level
international students (university education and higher) as a share of population, GDP per
capita, primary education, urbanization rate, the infant mortality rate, and life expectancy
at birth. All control variables are lagged five years. Finally, εi,t captures the omitted variables
and noise.
1.4.3 A First Look at the Relationship
The correlation coefficient value between Travel and Polity IV is about 0.62, which
is relatively high. The correlation coefficient for Polity in Host Countries, evaluated at
total number of travelers is 0.61. These numbers show that a basic relationship between
international travel and institutions does exist.8
As a next step to show the correlation between the independent variables and institutions,
table 1.2 columns (1)-(3) represent the ordinary least squares estimates for the dependent
variable Polity IV. Column (1) shows our baseline specification, with Travel, Polity, Average
Polity in Host Countries, and Average Polity in Host Countries * Travel included. All
variables are lagged five years to reflect the fact that institutions change slowly. Columns
(2) and (3) show the robustness of our baseline results to the inclusion of additional control
variables. These specifications explains roughly 0.80 percent of the variation in the dependent
variable. The high R-squared value reflects the presence of the lagged dependent variable
6The data section for more detail on the construction of all variables.
7All control variables are adopted from Barro (1999)
8Appendix table 1.8 reports partial correlations between institutions and all other explanatory variables.
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on the right hand side.
The five-year lagged dependent variable, Polity IVit−5, shows a strong statistical signifi-
cance and a coefficient value of 0.488. This indicates that institutions are persistent over time.
Variable Travel is statistically significant and has a negative coefficient value of 0.03. This
shows that international travel is negatively related to home country institutions once the
effect of institutions in host countries is taken into account.9 Polity in Host Countriesit−5
is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the effects of international travel
on home country institutions depend on the type of institutions in the host countries. The
interaction term, showing the marginal effect of travel, has positive and statistically signifi-
cant value. This reflect that the marginal effect of institutions in the host countries increases
with the number of travelers.
1.4.4 Instrument Construction
The travel variable is likely to be endogenous in equation 1.2, as countries with better
institutions may experience higher travel intensity due to reasons unrelated to institution
quality. Ordinary least squares estimates would be biased and inconsistent in this case.
We deal with this endogeneity by constructing an instrumental variable for international
travel. This instrument is constructed by using a travel bilateral gravity equation.10 We




Zij,t + δij,t (1.3)
where Travelij,t indicates the number of outbound travelers, as a share of population, from
the home country i to the host country j at time t, Zij,t is a set of regressors used by Andersen
and Dalgaard (2011) and Frankel and Romer (1999) and includes the distance between the
home country and the host country, population of the home country, population of the host
country, area of the home country, area of the host country, and dummy variables indicating
1 if the home country is landlocked and 0 otherwise, 1 if the host country is landlocked and
9Travelit−5 is positively related to institutions when not interacted with Polity in Host Countriesit−5.
10Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) and Frankel and Romer (1999) motivate our choice of explanatory vari-
ables in the gravity equation.
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0 otherwise, and 1 if a country pair shares a border and 0 otherwise (Contiguityi,j). The
above regression equation also contains interaction terms between Contiguityi,j and all other
variables.
The predicted values of travel variable from Equation 1.3 are calculated, and then







The values of travel variable obtained from equation 1.4 are used to instrument international
travel in the equation 1.2.
1.4.5 Instrument Validity
We use geographic factors to instrument for Travel. Geography has been shown to in-
fluence institutions. Easterly and Levine (2003); Rodrik et al. (2004) argue that geography
affected income through institutions. This would be problematic for our identification strat-
egy if we were to use geographic factors associated with institutional quality to instrument for
Travel. However, we avoid the geographic measures found to be associated with institutions,
such as latitude, area in the tropics, settler mortality, malaria proportion, etc. (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). Instead, we employ
geographic factors related to international travel but unrelated to institution quality.
We use the following geographic factors as instruments: distance between a country
pair, population size of both countries, area of both countries, whether the countries have
a sea shore, and whether the country pair shares a border. These geographic factors are
different than those factors directly related to institutions. For example, distance between a
country pair explains the flows of people between them but would have no direct effect on
institutions in those countries. Countries located close to each other can have very different
institutions, such as Austria and Serbia. Similarly, countries with a common border often
have very different levels of institutional quality. Consider, for example, the United States
and Mexico, or South Korea and North Korea.
The second set of instrumental variables, population size and area of both countries,
determines the outflow and inflow of people, but does not affect institution quality in either
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country. We may expect high flows of people from large countries, but we may not expect
large countries to have the same set of institutions (Canada vs. Russia). The final geographic
variable, landlocked, does not define political institutions, but affects international flows of
people. We may expect a high flows of people from countries with a seaport. This may
reflect that countries with a seaport trade more with the rest of the world, and hence show
more travel intensity.
1.4.6 Bilateral Travel Gravity Equation Estimation
As discussed previously, Travel is likely to be endogenous in the above model. People
from countries with better quality institutions may travel more due to reasons unrelated with
institutions. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirms endogeneity in the model. To deal with
this endogeneity an instrumental variable is needed. Andersen and Dalgaard (2011), based on
the argument by Frankel and Romer (1999), use geographic factors to instrument for travel.
We follow Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) and use the same instruments as Frankel and Romer
(1999) to estimate a bilateral travel gravity equation. Bilateral travel flows ln(Traveli,jt)
is the dependent variable in this equation, and shows the number of international travelers
from the home country i to the host country j at time t.
Table 1.3 provides OLS estimates for this bilateral travel gravity equation. This equation
explains about 32 percent of the variation in the bilateral flows of people. International travel
has a negative relationship with the distance between two countries. The elasticity of travel
with respect to distance is -1.54 for countries not sharing a border. This elasticity drops to
-1.24 if the country pair shares a border. This shows that as the distance between a country
pair increases, fewer people travel between them. The intensity of travel between country i
and j is decreasing with respect to the population size of the home country i, and increasing
with respect to the population size of the host country, j. This shows that, small countries
send, and large countries attract more international travelers. The intensity of travel between
a country pair is decreasing with respect to the area of country i, and increasing with respect
to the area of country j. The elasticity of travel with respect to home country area is -0.01,
if the country pair does not share a border, and -0.23 if the country pair shares a border.
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The elasticity of travel with respect to host country area is 0.25 if the country pair does not
share a border, and increases to 0.42 if they share a border.
On average, landlocked countries send and attract fewer international travelers. This is
shown by the negative and statistically significant coefficients for both variables Landlockedi
and Landlockedj. Variable Contiguityi,j shows whether two countries share a border or not.
The coefficient for this variable is statistically insignificant. This shows that, on average,
countries sharing a border do not show a higher flows of people between them. To test
the correlation between the fitted and the original values of variable travel, a simple OLS
regression equation is estimated. The results show an R-squared of 0.88, and the fitted values
show a coefficient value of 0.84.11
1.4.7 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Table 1.4 reports the Two-Stage Least Squares estimates for equation 1.2 where the ag-
gregate predicted values of international travel are used as an instrument for the endogenous
variable, Travel. The table repeats the specifications from equation 1.2 across the three
columns. The explanatory power of model improves, with the 2SLS estimates now explain-
ing 84% of the variation in a country’s Polity IV measure. The five-year lagged dependent
variable, Polity IVit−5, shows a statistically significant and economically large coefficient
value of 0.846 in Column (3). This indicates that institutions are persistent over time.
Travelit−5 has a statistically insignificant and negative coefficient value of -0.045 in Column
(3), showing that international travel, stripped of its institutional context, is not a positive
determinant of institutions in the home country. Our control variables, with the exception of
Primary Educationit−5, are not statistically significant. Primary Educationit−5 is positive
and statistically significant in both specifications in which it is included. This finding is con-
sistent with Barro (1999) and indicates that a more educated society seems to be conducive
to more democratic political institutions.
Average Polity in Host Countriest−5, our primary independent variables of interests,
has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in Column (1) but is positive and
11Results not reported here but available upon request.
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statistically significant once additional controls are included in Columns (2) and (3). This
indicates that the effects of international travel on home country institutions does appear
to depend on the type of institutions in the host countries once we control for the endo-
geneity of Travel and other variables that help to explain political institutions, such as
Primary Educationit−5. The interaction term, showing the marginal effect of travel, has
positive and statistically significant value in Columns (2) and (3), showing that the effect of
travel through host countries institutions increases with the extent of travel.
1.4.8 Alternative Dependent Variables
To further test the robustness of regression results, we employ two additional measures
of institutions as dependent variables: political rights index and civil liberties index. Table
1.5 shows regression results for political rights index from Freedom House as a dependent
variable. Political rights score is based on the extent to which citizens of a country enjoy
free and fair elections, competitive opposition, and representation of women and minority
groups. We repeat the same three specifications from table 1.4 and find very similar results.
Average PR in Host Countriesit−5 is positive and statistically significant across all three
specifications. Average political rights in host countries have a positive effect on political
rights in the home country and this effect increases with the number of travelers, as shown
by the interaction term Average PR in Host Countriesit−5 ∗ ln(Travelit−5). This implies
that international travel has a positive effect on the political rights in the home country only
if the flows of people is towards the host countries with better political rights and this effect
increases with the number of travelers.
Table 1.6 represents the TSLS regression results for civil liberties index as a dependent
variable. This index shows the extent to which citizens of a country enjoy freedom of expres-
sion, assembly, association, education, religion, a fair legal system, free economic activity,
and equal opportunities for everyone. Repeating our three primary specifications. The pos-
itive and statistically significant value on Civil Rights Indexit−5 in Columns (1)-(3) shows
that civil liberties variable are very persistent over time. In terms of our primary variables
of interest, Average CL in Host Countriesit− 5 is positive and statistically significantly
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related to civil liberties in a country. The interaction term with lagged travel is also posi-
tive and statistically significant. Combined these results are consistent with the view that
average civil liberties in host countries have a positive effect on civil liberties in the home
country and this effect increases with the number of travelers. This implies that interna-
tional travel only influences civil liberties in the home country through citizen flows towards
host countries with better civil liberties, and that this effects increases with the number of
travelers.
1.4.9 Institutional Convergence and System GMM
There are two concerns estimating a model like equation 1.2 (1) country specific effects
e.g. difference in taste or technologies (2) endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Taking
advantage of our panel data, we were able to exploit methodology suggested by Caselli et al.
(1996). Following Caselli et al. (1996) and Arellano and Bond (1991), we re-write the main
regression equation 1.2 as a dynamic model in the level of institution quality. We then take
the difference of the equation to eliminate any individual effects from the model. We then
used the lagged variables of all the regressors to instrument for the endogenous variable.
The system GMM results are presented in table 1.7. Column 1-3 report the polity iv
index, the political rights index, and the civil liberties index as dependent variables, re-
spectively. The lagged dependent variable, Institutionst−1, has a positive and statistically
significant coefficient value in all three columns. This indicates that institutions are con-
verging over time. A higher coefficient value implies that the rate of convergence is very
slow. International travel has a statistically insignificant coefficient for the polity iv, po-
litical rights, and civil liberties. Average institutions in the host countries is statistically
significant coefficient for political rights at 10 percent level of significance, and statistically
insignificant for the polity iv and civil liberties. This shows that if travelers go to countries
with better political rights, they will help improve political rights in their home countries.
Although, our results in the system GMM settings are not consistent with OLS and two-
stage least squares, we do find evidence for institutional convergence among countries in the
system GMM settings.
Imran Arif Chapter 1. International Flows of People and Institutional Convergence 19
1.5 Conclusion
Recent research shows that institutions are the key determinants of economic growth.
Economic activity flourishes in the environment of good institutions, as people have an
incentive to invest in physical and human capital. This paper adds to the existing literature
by exploring whether institutions can transmit from one country to another country through
human interaction. In that respect, this paper hypothesizes that as people travel abroad,
they come into contact with foreign ideas, beliefs, and institutions. This exposure may
help them to improve institutions in their home countries. Specifically, this paper analyzes
whether international travel improve institution quality in the home country.
To test the relationship between international travel and institutions, this study uses
UNWTO dyadic travel data and three measures of institutions: polity iv index, political
rights index, and civil liberties index. International travel is likely to be endogenous in
the model, as countries with better quality institutions may experience a high volume of
international travel due to reasons unrelated with institutions. To deal with this endogeneity,
an instrument variable is constructed by estimating a bilateral travel gravity equation, the
predicted travel values are aggregated, and used as an instrument for international travel.
An unbalanced panel data of 149 countries during the period 1995-2012 in the TSLS
settings reveal that institutions are very persistent over time. There is no direct evidence that
international travel is a significant determinant of institutions in the home country. However,
institution quality in the host countries has a positive effect on home country institutions
and this effect increases with the number of international travelers. These results are, mostly,
robust to the inclusion of other control variables and across three measures of institutions:
polity iv index, political rights index, and civil liberties index. Although, our results in the
system GMM settings are not consistent with OLS and two-stage least squares, but we do
find evidence for institutional convergence among countries in the system GMM settings. An
important policy suggestion from this study is to adopt an open foreign policy, to promote
international good will, start soft visa programs with other countries to stimulate flows of
people, so that the citizens of a country can learn from foreigners, and promote institutions
in their home countries.
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1.6 Appendix
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Source: UNWTO Annual Report 2013.
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Source: UNWTO Tourism Highlights 2013 Edition.
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Figure 1.5: International Travel (Region-wise)
Europe & Central Asia East Asia & Pacific North America Latin America & Caribbean










































































































Figure 1.6: International Travel (Income Group-wise)
High income Upper middle income
























































Notes: Income classifications are taken from the World Bank (see WDI) and the data source is the UNWTO
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Polity IV 2509 0.68 0.32 0.00 1.00
Political Rights 2764 0.61 0.36 0.00 1.00
Civil Liberties 2764 0.61 0.30 0.00 1.00
ln(Travel) 2950 −2.24 1.90 −7.22 2.12
Polity in Host Countries 2950 0.70 0.23 0.02 1.00
Political Rights in Host Countries 2950 0.61 0.27 0.02 1.00
Civil Liberties in Host Countries 2950 0.60 0.24 0.02 1.00
ln(Students) 2950 −7.51 1.81 −16.51 −3.22
Infant Mortality Rate 2906 34.69 31.70 1.60 158.30
ln(Life Expectancy) 2864 4.21 0.16 3.45 4.42
Urbanization Rate 2949 2.23 2.07 −4.36 17.90
ln(GDP per capita) 2866 8.08 1.63 4.17 11.64
Primary Education 2946 5.68 0.90 3 8
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Table 1.2: Dependent Variable: Polity IV Index (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS
ln(Travelit−5) -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Polity IV Indexit−5 0.488*** 0.524*** 0.513***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Average Polity in Host Countriesit−5 0.361*** 0.353*** 0.343***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041)




ln(GDP per capitait−5) 0.001 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006)








Constant 0.150*** 0.106* 0.145**
(0.032) (0.057) (0.062)
Observations 1,746 1,722 1,721
R-squared 0.797 0.808 0.804
Number of countries 149 145 145
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is polity iv index. Ordinary least squares estimates. The sample is an unbalanced panel
comprising annual data between 1995-2012.
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Table 1.3: Bilateral Travel Gravity Equation




















Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Pooled OLS estimates. The dependent variable is
the total number of international travelers as a share of population,
from country i to country j. The sample is an unbalanced panel
comprising bilateral annual data between 1995-2012.
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Table 1.4: Dependent Variable: Polity IV Index (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TSLS TSLS TSLS
ln(Travelit−5) -0.016 -0.047* -0.045*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Polity IV Indexit−5 0.857*** 0.849*** 0.846***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Average Polity in Host Countriesit−5 0.127 0.235*** 0.222***
(0.090) (0.072) (0.077)




ln(GDP per capitait−5) -0.004 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005)








Constant 0.029 -0.020 0.001
(0.072) (0.094) (0.088)
Observations 1,708 1,699 1,698
R-squared 0.843 0.841 0.841
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is Polity IV index. Two-stage least squares estimates. The predicted values of
variable travel are used as an instrument for the travel. The sample is an unbalanced panel
comprising annual data between 1995-2012.
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Table 1.5: Dependent Variable: Political Rights Index (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TSLS TSLS TSLS
ln(Travelit−5) -0.037** -0.049*** -0.046**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Political Rights Index(PR)it−5 0.857*** 0.851*** 0.837***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Average PR in Host Countriesit−5 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.211***
(0.051) (0.045) (0.049)




ln(GDP per capitait−5) 0.014** 0.002
(0.006) (0.005)








Constant -0.037 -0.155** -0.055
(0.043) (0.075) (0.071)
Observations 1,822 1,812 1,788
R-squared 0.845 0.843 0.843
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is political rights index. Two-stage least squares estimates. The pre-
dicted values of variable travel are used as an instrument for the travel. The sample is an
unbalanced panel comprising annual data between 1995-2012.
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Table 1.6: Dependent Variable: Civil Liberties Index (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TSLS TSLS TSLS
ln(Travelit−5) -0.030** -0.039*** -0.035**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Civil Rights Index(CL)it−5 0.902*** 0.900*** 0.883***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Average CL in Host Countriesit−5 0.138*** 0.146*** 0.147***
(0.045) (0.038) (0.042)




ln(GDP per capitait−5) 0.010** 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)








Constant -0.004 -0.089 -0.009
(0.035) (0.056) (0.052)
Observations 1,822 1,812 1,788
R-squared 0.877 0.876 0.877
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is civil liberties index. Two-stage least squares estimates. The pre-
dicted values of variable travel are used as an instrument for the travel. The sample is an
unbalanced panel comprising annual data between 1995-2012.
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Table 1.7: Institutional Convergence (System GMM)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Polity IV Political Rights Civil Liberties
Institutionst−1 0.888*** 0.862*** 0.928***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.028)
Travel t−1 0.004 -0.010 -0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.006)
Average Institutions in Host Countriest−1 0.093 0.096* 0.007
(0.060) (0.051) (0.032)
Average Institutions in Host Countriest−1* Travel t−1 -0.008 0.007 0.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.010)
Constant -0.008 0.108 0.027
(0.088) (0.103) (0.020)
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,201 2,422 2,422
Number of countries 154 171 171
Long-run elasticity (Travel) 0.04 -0.07 -0.06
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. System GMM estimates. The dependent variable is polity iv in
column 1, political rights in column 2, and civil liberties in column3. Long-run elasticity (Travel)=beta (Travel
































Table 1.8: Correlation Matrix
Polity IV 1
Political Rights 0.94 1
Civil Liberties 0.91 0.94 1
Travel 0.62 0.61 0.66 1
Polity in Host Countries 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.56 1
Political Rights in Host Countries 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.53 0.91 1
Civil Liberties in Host Countries 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.54 0.87 0.95 1
Students 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.56 0.22 0.19 0.22 1
Infant Mortality Rate -0.65 -0.65 -0.67 -0.81 -0.52 -0.52 -0.56 -0.45 1
Life Expectancy 0.61 0.6 0.62 0.74 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.39 -0.94 1
Urbanization Rate -0.45 -0.46 -0.44 -0.58 -0.43 -0.36 -0.37 -0.36 0.64 -0.52 1
GDP per capita 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.82 0.51 0.54 0.6 0.48 -0.92 0.9 -0.51 1



















































1995 128.50 515.56 27.42 18.08 140.03 7.34 11.31 848.23
1996 140.25 556.75 29.44 19.06 145.48 7.63 12.39 911.00
1997 146.17 562.70 30.90 20.05 146.45 7.87 12.82 926.96
1998 146.43 579.65 34.59 21.22 153.68 8.12 14.17 957.85
1999 160.33 608.10 35.45 22.13 158.24 8.90 14.42 1007.57
2000 182.48 691.05 38.42 29.25 173.32 10.91 14.37 1139.80
2001 188.56 687.74 37.43 30.74 165.48 10.89 16.39 1137.23
2002 194.37 688.62 34.21 34.55 160.74 11.50 17.19 1141.18
2003 191.76 700.62 32.78 38.61 152.43 13.06 18.83 1148.10
2004 230.94 722.46 39.63 44.63 166.43 15.94 18.79 1238.82
2005 240.91 765.56 41.47 45.74 166.44 15.65 19.62 1295.38
2006 254.45 802.20 45.19 50.19 173.56 17.88 24.74 1368.20
2007 270.93 837.97 49.57 54.59 173.69 20.12 26.16 1433.04
2008 270.95 846.95 51.08 58.21 169.26 19.09 27.74 1443.27
2009 268.75 796.11 48.80 58.76 160.66 17.28 24.80 1375.16
2010 300.76 832.94 53.14 61.92 168.25 20.58 26.01 1463.60
2011 319.24 853.25 58.31 64.81 172.07 24.85 24.90 1517.43
2012 342.10 887.97 62.45 62.91 172.34 24.81 23.98 1576.56
Total 3977.88 12936.20 750.27 735.44 2918.54 262.42 348.62 21929.37

















































1995 15.15% 60.78% 3.23% 2.13% 16.51% 0.87% 1.33%
1996 15.40% 61.11% 3.23% 2.09% 15.97% 0.84% 1.36%
1997 15.77% 60.70% 3.33% 2.16% 15.80% 0.85% 1.38%
1998 15.29% 60.52% 3.61% 2.22% 16.04% 0.85% 1.48%
1999 15.91% 60.35% 3.52% 2.20% 15.71% 0.88% 1.43%
2000 16.01% 60.63% 3.37% 2.57% 15.21% 0.96% 1.26%
2001 16.58% 60.48% 3.29% 2.70% 14.55% 0.96% 1.44%
2002 17.03% 60.34% 3.00% 3.03% 14.09% 1.01% 1.51%
2003 16.70% 61.02% 2.85% 3.36% 13.28% 1.14% 1.64%
2004 18.64% 58.32% 3.20% 3.60% 13.43% 1.29% 1.52%
2005 18.60% 59.10% 3.20% 3.53% 12.85% 1.21% 1.51%
2006 18.60% 58.63% 3.30% 3.67% 12.69% 1.31% 1.81%
2007 18.91% 58.48% 3.46% 3.81% 12.12% 1.40% 1.83%
2008 18.77% 58.68% 3.54% 4.03% 11.73% 1.32% 1.92%
2009 19.54% 57.89% 3.55% 4.27% 11.68% 1.26% 1.80%
2010 20.55% 56.91% 3.63% 4.23% 11.50% 1.41% 1.78%
2011 21.04% 56.23% 3.84% 4.27% 11.34% 1.64% 1.64%
2012 21.70% 56.32% 3.96% 3.99% 10.93% 1.57% 1.52%
Total 18.14% 58.99% 3.42% 3.35% 13.31% 1.20% 1.59%
































Table 1.11: Travel Patterns (Income Group-wise)
Year High income Low income Lower middle income Upper middle income Total
(Million) (%Share) (Million) (%Share) (Million) (%Share) (Million) (%Share)
1995 761.22 89.74% 477.69% 0.56% 26.80 3.16% 55.44 6.54% 848.23
1996 811.71 89.10% 557.95% 0.61% 34.13 3.75% 59.58 6.54% 911.00
1997 820.29 88.49% 536.95% 0.58% 36.32 3.92% 64.98 7.01% 926.96
1998 847.42 88.47% 549.70% 0.57% 36.36 3.80% 68.57 7.16% 957.85
1999 890.36 88.37% 587.12% 0.58% 40.03 3.97% 71.32 7.08% 1007.57
2000 1002.91 87.99% 637.14% 0.56% 47.93 4.20% 82.60 7.25% 1139.80
2001 993.97 87.40% 701.62% 0.62% 49.94 4.39% 86.30 7.59% 1137.23
2002 991.58 86.89% 826.59% 0.72% 52.79 4.63% 88.54 7.76% 1141.18
2003 989.77 86.21% 933.84% 0.81% 53.49 4.66% 95.51 8.32% 1148.10
2004 1052.34 84.95% 1001.07% 0.81% 59.28 4.79% 117.18 9.46% 1238.82
2005 1105.15 85.31% 919.63% 0.71% 60.43 4.67% 120.60 9.31% 1295.38
2006 1154.44 84.38% 1188.27% 0.87% 67.36 4.92% 134.52 9.83% 1368.20
2007 1193.52 83.29% 1465.11% 1.02% 76.64 5.35% 148.22 10.34% 1433.04
2008 1192.79 82.64% 1591.11% 1.10% 78.82 5.46% 155.76 10.79% 1443.27
2009 1131.17 82.26% 1489.84% 1.08% 71.52 5.20% 157.57 11.46% 1375.16
2010 1187.22 81.12% 1602.64% 1.10% 80.08 5.47% 180.27 12.32% 1463.60
2011 1212.26 79.89% 1505.82% 0.99% 91.12 6.00% 199.00 13.11% 1517.43
2012 1245.56 79.00% 1519.04% 0.96% 99.36 6.30% 216.45 13.73% 1576.56
Total 18583.67 84.74% 18091.15% 0.82% 1062.40 4.84% 2102.39 9.59% 21929.37
































Table 1.12: List of Countries in the Sample
Afghanistan Colombia Iceland Mozambique Slovenia
Albania Comoros India Oman Somalia
Algeria Congo, Rep. Indonesia Namibia South Africa
Andorra Costa Rica Iran, Islamic Rep. Nepal Zimbabwe
Angola Croatia Iraq Netherlands Spain
Antigua and Barbuda Cuba Ireland Aruba Swaziland
Azerbaijan Cyprus Israel Vanuatu Sweden
Argentina Czech Republic Italy New Zealand Switzerland
Australia Benin Cote d’Ivoire Nicaragua Syrian Arab Republic
Austria Denmark Jamaica Niger Tajikistan
Bahamas, The Dominica Japan Nigeria Thailand
Bahrain Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Norway Togo
Bangladesh Ecuador Jordan Palau Tonga
Armenia El Salvador Kenya Pakistan Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados Ethiopia Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Panama United Arab Emirates
Bermuda Eritrea Korea, Rep. Papua New Guinea Tunisia
Bhutan Estonia Kuwait Paraguay Turkey
Bolivia Fiji Kyrgyz Republic Peru Turkmenistan
Bosnia and Herzegovina Finland Lebanon Philippines Tuvalu
Botswana France Lesotho Poland Uganda
Brazil Djibouti Latvia Portugal Ukraine
Belize Gabon Liberia Guinea-Bissau Macedonia, FYR
Brunei Darussalam Georgia Libya Puerto Rico Egypt, Arab Rep.
Bulgaria Gambia, The Lithuania Qatar United Kingdom
Myanmar Germany Luxembourg Russian Federation Tanzania
Burundi Ghana Madagascar Rwanda United States
Belarus Greece Malawi San Marino Uruguay
Cambodia Greenland Malaysia Sao Tome and Principe Uzbekistan
Cameroon Grenada Maldives Saudi Arabia Venezuela, RB
Canada Guatemala Mali Senegal Samoa
Central African Republic Guinea Malta Seychelles Yemen, Rep.
Sri Lanka Guyana Mexico Sierra Leone Zambia
Chad Haiti Mongolia Singapore
Chile Honduras Moldova Slovak Republic





This paper investigates whether foreign qualified students bring new ideas and technical
expertise from abroad, disperse them, and stimulate aggregate productivity in their home
countries. An instrumental variable is derived from a fitted gravity equation model. An
unbalanced panel data of 111 countries during the period 1950-2012 shows that foreign
education has a statistically significant effect on technology diffusion. The results are robust
across different sub-samples and to the inclusion of other channels of technology diffusion.
These findings should prove helpful to policy makers in developing economies to adopt more
open education policies and to increase public spending on foreign education.
2.1 Introduction
Differences in total factor productivity (TFP) explain a major part of the differences in
income across countries,1 but why does TFP differ across countries and what can be learned
about the mechanisms through which technologies disperse across countries? Economic
literature ascribes difference in total factor productivity to two factors: geographic factors
and cross country movement of goods and services.2 Some countries are geographically
closer to technological frontiers and can benefit from the technological progress of these
1 see (Caselli, 2005; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999)
2see Keller (2004) for the review of the literature. Also see Andersen and Dalgaard (2011)
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technology leaders.3 Cross country movement of goods and services is important because
foreign technologies can be imported by the flows of goods and services across borders. To
explore these channels of technology transfer, earlier research focuses on two channels of
technology transfer: international trade4 and foreign direct investment (FDI).5 This paper
expands this literature and explores whether technologies diffuse across countries as a result
of foreign education.
Relatively few studies have focused on the relationship between foreign education and
technology transfer. To the author’s knowledge, Park (2004) and Le (2010) are the only
papers considering the R&D spillover across countries via international student mobility.
Park (2004) explores the relationship between international student flow and R&D spillovers,
and finds a positive and statistically significant role of foreign education on TFP in 21 OECD
countries. Le (2010) finds strong evidence in favor of R&D spillovers from developed countries
to less developed countries during 1998-2005 as a result of student mobility.
This paper extends and improves Park (2004) and Le (2010) in the following ways. First,
this paper uses a larger data set: both in terms of countries and time period. Foreign
educated students need to graduate before returning to their home countries. The data
set used in this study comprise of 111 countries during the period 1950-2012. This long
observation period allows to test the long run effects of foreign education on technology
diffusion as well as helps us understand the process of technology diffusion during different
time periods. Second, this paper corrects for the likely endogeneity in the model using an
instrumental variables method.
To empirically investigate the relationship between the technology diffusion and foreign
education and to deal with the omitted variables and unobserved factors, this paper correct
for endogeneity by constructing an instrument for foreign education. High TFP (advanced)
countries may exchange more foreign students than low TFP (developing) countries due to
reason unrelated to TFP. As we can see from figure 2.3 that top ten countries host more
than 50 percent of total international students. All these countries have relatively high TFP
3see Howitt (2000) and Eaton and Kortum (2002). Also see Gallup et al. (1999).
4see for example Coe and Helpman (1995), Engelbrecht (1997), Keller (1998), Lee (2006), and Edmond
(2001)
5see De La Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) and Lee (2006).
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and are technologically advanced. Some unobserved factors can also affect foreign education
as well as technology diffusion. For example, Spilimbergo (2009), Kim (1998), and Barnett
and Wu (1995) argue that foreign education is motivated by geographic factors and bilateral
links. Geographic factors are also correlated with technology diffusion (Diamond, 1999;
Gallup et al., 1999; Andersen and Dalgaard, 2011). This shows that geographic factors can
affect both technology level and foreign education.
To deal with this endogeneity, this paper constructs an instrument for the endogenous
variable ’Students Abroad’. This instrument is constructed using bilateral student flows
across countries and contains three explanatory variables: home country population, host
country population, and the popularity of the destination country among international stu-
dents. These variables show the choice of destination country by the international students.
The popularity of the host country variable shows the total number of international students
enrolled in the host country excluding students from the home country. These variables are
valid instrument because they explain the choice of host country and do not affect technology
level in the home country.
First stage pooled OLS results show that foreign education is strongly and positively
correlated with host country population size and negatively correlated with home country
population size. This shows that large countries, on average, attract more students, and small
countries send more students abroad. Variable popularity of the host country captures the
popularity of the destination country among international students. The results show that
popularity of the host country (among international students) is a statistically significant
determinant of bilateral flows of students. International students are 65 percent more likely
to choose the same host country which other students are choosing. The fitted values of
bilateral flows of people are then summed up and used as an instrument for student abroad.
Two-stage least squares estimates show that foreign education has a statistically signifi-
cant and positive effect on TFP. The TFP has an elasticity of 0.04 with respect to student
abroad. These results are robust across different time periods and to the inclusion of other
channels of technology diffusion: trade flow and foreign direct investment. These findings
support the main hypothesis of this paper that foreign education is a significant source of
technology diffusion and productivity growth for the home country. Foreign-educated indi-
Imran Arif Chapter 2. Foreign Education, Technology Diffusion, and Productivity 41
viduals learn new ideas while studying abroad, bring new knowledge to their home countries,
promote technology diffusion, and boost productivity growth.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 highlights the channels through
which foreign education helps international technology diffusion, section 2.3 describes the
data, section 2.4 presents the empirical methodology and estimation results, and section 2.5
concludes this paper.
2.2 How Does Foreign Education Help Technology Dif-
fusion?
So how does foreign education helps cross country technology diffusion? Foreign edu-
cation increases human interaction and help foreign students learn tacit part of new tech-
nologies. Many authors believe that a major part of knowledge is tacit in nature and some
type of human interaction is required to learn this tacit technology6. Learning by interaction
and imitation is not a new concept. For example, Arrow (1969) argues that technological
knowledge transfers through human international, Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that
income grows through the exchange of ideas through communication and travel, Andersen
and Dalgaard (2011); Tani and Joyeux (2013) argue that international flows of people in-
crease productivity of the home country, Hildebrandt et al. (2005); Pfutze (2012) argue that
the knowledge of health and democracy transfers through international human interaction,
and Durand et al. (1996) argue that international human interaction stimulates economic
activity. Le (2008) uses a pooled dataset of OECD countries and finds that highly skilled
workers import R&D from other countries. Similarly, Le (2012) uses data during the period
1998-2006 to find R&D spillovers by highly skilled workers from industrialized countries to
African countries.
Foreign education also helps developing countries to import new technologies from abroad.
Import of technology is, specifically, important for developing countries to increase their pro-
ductivity These countries, by sending their students abroad, can take advantage of the stock
6See Agrawal et al. (2006); Almeida and Kogut (1999); Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) for empirical
evidence in favor of knowledge diffusion by personal contact.
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of knowledge, produced outside their national borders. The role of foreign education, in the
country of origin, is explored by some authors. For example, Spilimbergo (2009) finds that
the foreign educated individuals promote democracy in the country of origin. Bergerhoff
et al. (2013) find international student mobility increases steady state growth rate of both
the host and origin country by 0.013 percent.
2.3 Data
This paper uses an unbalanced annual panel data of 111 countries7 during the period
1950-2012. This section briefly describes the variables and data sources of this paper.
Total Factor Productivity: The main dependent variable of this paper, total factor
productivity, is taken from Penn World Table version 8.1 (PWT 8.1).8 PWT 8.1 reports TFP
accounting for variable labor share in GDP and variable depreciation rates across countries.9
PWT 8.1 data are different from earlier studies, for example, Hall and Jones (1999) and
Caselli (2005) constructed TFP by assuming a constant depreciation rate across countries
and over time.
Students Abroad: The main explanatory variable of this paper is the total number
of tertiary level international students (university education and higher) as a share of pop-
ulation, denoted by ’Students Abroad’. This variable refers to students who cross national
border to study outside their country of citizenship, or are enrolled in a distance learning
program abroad. The data for this variable are taken from UNESCO.10 These data cover
those students who are pursuing a higher education degree outside their country of residence
and exclude those students who are studying abroad for less than a full school year.
These data are reported by the receiving countries, which collect these data from local
education institutions. These data are available only for few countries before 1960 but covers
almost all host countries and majority of home countries for the period 1960-2012. These data
have some limitation (1) some countries do not specify the country of origin of the arriving
7List of countries in the appendix.
8variable ’ctfp’ in Penn World Table version 8.1.
9see Inklaar and Timmer (2013) and Feenstra et al. (2015) for a complete discussion
10UNESCO online data is available only from 2000 to 2012. The author is thankful to Antonio Spilimbergo
(Spilimbergo, 2009) for sharing UNESCO data for the period 1950-2002.
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students. This makes the number of students from the origin country underreported (2)
UNESCO do not split data according to the field of study. The contribution of a foreign
educated engineer on home country technology is likely to be different than that of a history
major.
Geographic Factors: Following Andersen and Dalgaard (2011), this paper uses three
geographic factors to account for cross country differences in technology and productivity
due to geography: a dummy variable denoted as ’Landlocked’, which takes a value of 1 if
the country is landlocked and 0 otherwise, fraction of land area in the tropics (% Area in
Tropics), and latitude of a country (Latitude). Data for landlocked and fraction of area in
the tropics are taken from Gallup et al. (1999), and data for latitude are taken from Hall
and Jones (1999).
Other Variables: This paper uses polity IV index (denoted as ’Institutions’) as a
measure of institution quality in the home country. Data for trade flow (imports and exports
as a percentage of GDP) and FDI (percentage of GDP) are taken from World Development




Partial correlations give the first impression about the relationship between two variables.
Table 2.2 reports partial correlations between the dependent variable ’TFP; and all other
explanatory variables. The table shows that the correlation between TFP and student is
positive. The correlation is positive between TFP and institutions, and latitude, and negative
for landlocked, percent area in the tropics. This provides the first evidence that foreign
education promotes the process of technology diffusion across countries.
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2.4.2 Model
This paper employs a simple model to analyze the relationship between foreign education
and technology diffusion.
ln(TFPit) = β0 + β1ln(Studentsi,t−5) + β2Xit + υit (2.1)
Here the primary variable of interest is Studentsi,t. The dependent variable of this paper
is total factor productivity, ln(TFP ). Xit is the vector of control variables and includes
the percentage area of a country in the tropical zone (% Area in Tropics), latitude of home
country (Latitude), polity IV index (Institutions), total trade flow of country (Trade), for-
eign direct investment (FDI), and landlocked dummy variable indicating 1 if the country is
landlocked and 0 otherwise (Landlocked).
This paper analyzes the impact of foreign education on technology diffusion in three time
periods: the short run (5-year lag), the medium run (10-year lag), and the long run (20-
year lag). These lags capture the idea, that students need to graduate and return to their
home countries before they disperse the knowledge that they acquired in the foreign country.
These lags also reveal the long run effects of foreign education on technology diffusion in home
country.
2.4.3 Bilateral Equation Estimation
Foreign education is likely to be endogenous in the above model as high TFP (advanced)
countries may exchange more foreign students than low TFP (developing) countries. Some
unobserved factors may also affect foreign education as well as technology diffusion. For
example, Spilimbergo (2009), Kim (1998), and Barnett and Wu (1995) argue that foreign
education is motivated by geographic factors and bilateral links. This implies that coun-
tries close to each other may exchange more students and hence transfer more technologies
between them. Geographic factors are also correlated with technology diffusion (Diamond,
1999; Gallup et al., 1999; Andersen and Dalgaard, 2011).
This paper deals with this endogeniety problem by an instrumental variable method. In
the first stage, this paper follows Spilimbergo (2009) strategy and uses population of home
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country, population of host country, and the popularity of the host country to instrument for
student. Variable popularity is calculated as the total number of international students in
host country excluding students from the home country. The popularity of the host country
among international students may depend on the availability of scholarships, ease to get into
the host country, and other factors. This variable is a good instrument for foreign education
as it satisfies the exclusion restriction. It explains the choice of destination country but does




Zij,t + δij,t (2.2)
Where Zij,t is the set of regressors including home country population, host country popu-
lation, and the populatrity of the host country among international students. Specifically,
this paper estimates the following bilateral equation:
ln(Studentsij,t) = α0 + α1ln(Popi,t) + α2ln(Popj,t) + α3ln(Popularityjt) + εij (2.3)
Where Popi is the population size of home country, Popj is the population size of host
country, and Popularityjt is the total number of students in host country excluding students
from home country. In the first stage, this paper uses the above gravity equation and
predicts foreign students flow. These predicted values are then summed up to find fitted







In the second stage, above fitted values from equation 2.4 are used as an instrument for
Student variable in equation 2.1.
The bilateral foreign education equation results are presented in table 2.3 in the appendix.
Column 1 represents pooled OLS regression results without including any fixed and time
effects. This model explains about 45 percent of the variation in the bilateral student flows.
Home country population size has a negative and host country population size has a positive
effect on the students flows from country i to country j. The elasticity of bilateral student
flows with respect to home and host country population is 0.64 and 0.13, respectively. This
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shows that 10 percent increase in the host and the home country population is associated
1.3 percent increase in the inflows of students for the host country and 6.4 percent decrease
in the outflows of students from the host country. As expected, some countries are more
popular among international students than other countries, as shown by the positive and
statistically significant coefficient for popularity. Students are 60 percent more likely to
choose the destination country which other students are choosing.
Column 2 reports fixed effects estimates and include both time and fixed effect in the
model. This model explains about 45 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. The
elasticity of bilateral student flows with respect to home country population, host country
population, and the popularity of host country is 0.63, 0.09, and 0.65 respectively. Where
the first two elasticities are lower while elasticity of popularity of host country is about 8
percent greater than pooled OLS model. This paper uses pooled OLS model to predict
bilateral student flows variable.
2.4.4 2SLS Estimation
Table 2.4 in the appendix presents ln(TFP) as a dependent variable. Column 1 reports
pooled OLS estimate for ln(TFP) as a dependent variable and only main explanatory vari-
able, student abroad, on the right hand side. Students abroad has a positive and statistically
significant coefficient value. TFP has an elasticity of 0.01 with respect to student abroad.
The results does not change much in the fixed effects settings in column 2, while the coeffi-
cient value stays the same, standard error decreases by 60 percent in the fixed effects settings.
Column 3 reports two-stage least squares estimate for student abroad and column 4-7 in-
clude additional control variables. In two-stage least squares settings students abroad has a
positive and statistically significant coefficient value. The elasticity of TFP with respect to
student abroad increases from 0.014, in OLS setting, to 0.065 in the two-stage least squares
setting. This indicates that reverse causality is not a big issue in the model. This also shows
that an increase in the student abroad by 10 percent is associated with an increase in the
TFP by 0.6 percent. The coefficient for student abroad remains positive and statistically
significant after the inclusion of other control variables in column 4-7.
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Other Control Variables:
Institution quality index, in column 4 has a positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cient, depicting the critical role of institutions in the diffusion of technologies. Geographic
factors in column 5 have their expected causal effect on technology diffusion. Landlocked
and percent area in tropics has a negative while latitude has a positive effect on technology
diffusion. Column 6 and 7 include foreign direct investment (percent of GDP) and total
trade (percent of GDP) as control variables in the model, respectively. FDI has a statisti-
cally insignificant while trade has positive and statistically significant effect on technology
diffusion.
Robustness Tests:
Table 2.5 reports 2SLS estimates for ln(TFP) as dependent variables and compares results
in the short run, medium run and the long run. Here short run, medium run, and long run
imply that the main explanatory variable, student abroad, is lagged 5-year, 10-year, and 20-
year, respectively. Student abroad has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in the
short, medium, and long run. The coefficient values for other control variables are relatively
stable. Table 2.6 presents 2SLS estimates for ln(TFP) as dependent variables and compares
results during three time periods: over all sample (1950-2012), after 1985 (1984-2012), and
before 1985 (1950-1985).11 Students abroad variable has positive and statistically significant
coefficient for all sample period. All other variables show stable and expected coefficients.
Moreover, system GMM results12 further confirm the robustness of the results.
2.5 Conclusion
Many developing countries invest significant public and private resources on foreign edu-
cation. While individual spendings on foreign education are motivated by the economic and
social returns, public spending, specifically, aims to import technological knowledge from
abroad. This paper tests whether the investment in foreign education has any significant
11The choice of 1985 is arbitrary.
12Results are available upon request.
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effect on technology diffusion. To analyze the effects of foreign education on technology
diffusion, this paper uses an instrumental variable method and an unbalanced data of 111
countries between the period 1950-2012. The results show that foreign education has a posi-
tive and statistically strong positive effect on total factor productivity. The effects of foreign
education are robust to the inclusion of other channels of international technology diffusion
and remain for a long period of time.
The policy makers in developing countries can draw some important policy recommen-
dations from this paper. They can allocate more public resources for foreign education to
provide more scholarships for study abroad programs, and to attract foreign qualified in-
dividuals by providing more research funding, fellowships, grants, and other opportunities
in home country. Developing countries can also promote foreign education by following a
friendly foreign policy to start soft visa programs to facilitate international student mobility.
This can reduce the student visa refusal rate.
Other countries impose visa barriers to student (1) due to security, (2) due to the fear
that foreigners may harm their culture, and (3) students will not leave their country after
graduating and steal their jobs. A good foreign policy is essential to cope with (1) and (2)
but a good visa facilitation program is required for number (3). One such program includes
J1 visa program by the U.S. government. The U.S. government gives J1 visa to foreign
students and scholars to study in the US on the condition that they will go back to their
home country and serve in their home country not less than the period they spent in the US.
Developing countries can start this type of visa programs with other developed countries to
ensure that their student will come back.
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Figure 2.3: Top Ten Destination Countries for International Students
Data source: UNESCO
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
ln(TFP) 4750 −0.45 0.52 −2.38 2.00
ln(GDP per capita) 7100 8.48 1.24 5.22 11.97
ln(Student Abroad) 7100 5.39 1.96 −6.55 10.42
ln(Student Abroad Fitted) 7086 6.18 2.27 −6.95 13.96
Institutions 7395 0.54 0.37 0.00 1.00
Landlocked 8400 0.18 0.38 0 1
% Area in Tropics 7213 0.33 0.41 0.00 1.00
Latitude 7120 15.75 24.26 −36.89 63.89
FDI 5562 3.17 7.46 −82.89 173.45
Trade 6698 75.71 48.92 0.02 531.74
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Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix
TFP 1
GDP p.c. 0.59 1
Students 0.15 0.25 1
Students (fitted) 0.14 0.23 0.64 1
Institutions 0.21 0.44 0.13 0.12 1
Landlocked -0.2 -0.17 0 -0.01 -0.05 1
% Area in Tropics -0.32 -0.38 -0.21 -0.2 -0.2 -0.06 1
Latitude 0.29 0.34 0.19 0.18 0.28 -0.14 -0.37 1
FDI -0.02 0.09 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.02 -0.01 1
Trade 0.03 0.08 0.38 0.29 0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.08 0.27 1
Imran Arif Chapter 2. Foreign Education, Technology Diffusion, and Productivity 54
Table 2.3: Bilateral Foreign Education Equation
ln(Bilateral Flow of Students)
Pooled Fixed
ln(Home Country Population)it -0.640*** -0.631***
(0.003) (0.003)
ln(Destination Country Population)jt 0.134*** 0.086***
(0.004) (0.005)




Time effects? No Yes
Home country effects? No Yes
Host country effects? No Yes
N 125747 125747
R-squared 0.45 0.45
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising annual data between 1950-2012.
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Table 2.4: Dependent Variable: ln(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS FE TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
ln(Student Abroad)it−5 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Institutionsit−5 0.224*** 0.148*** 0.069*** 0.146***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021)
Landlocked -0.345*** -0.400*** -0.420***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.024)
% Area in Tropics -0.364*** -0.427*** -0.380***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.021)






Constant -0.587*** -0.523*** -0.788*** -0.891*** -0.645*** -0.638*** -0.623***
(0.056) (0.012) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.044) (0.030)
Observations 4,190 4,190 4,189 3,995 3,523 2,474 3,068
R-squared 0.056 0.010 0.056 0.073 0.249 0.302 0.287
Time effects? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample is an unbalanced
panel comprising annual data between 1950-2012. OLS estimates in column 1, fixed effects in column 2, and 2SLS
in column 3-7. The dependent variable is ln(TFP).
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Table 2.5: Medium Run and Long Run (Pooled 2SLS)
ln(TFP)
(1) (2) (3)













Landlocked -0.345*** -0.329*** -0.328***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
% Area in Tropics -0.364*** -0.362*** -0.374***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Latitude 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.645*** -0.656*** -0.700***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Observations 3,523 3,231 2,568
R-squared 0.249 0.276 0.347
Time effects? Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising an-
nual data between 1950-2012. Two-stage least squares estimates. The
dependent variable is ln(TFP).
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Table 2.6: Time Period (cut-off 1985)
VARIABLES ln(TFP)
(1) (2) (3)
Over-all sample After 1985 Before 1985
(1950-2012) (1985-2012) (1950-1985)
ln(Student Abroad)it−5 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.059***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Institutionsit−5 0.148*** 0.234*** 0.143***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
Landlocked -0.345*** -0.360*** -0.237***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.033)
% Area in Tropics -0.364*** -0.415*** -0.274***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029)
Latitude 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.645*** -0.867*** -0.590***
(0.027) (0.043) (0.034)
Observations 3,523 1,944 1,498
R-squared 0.249 0.349 0.185
Time effects? Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising annual data between 1950-
2012. Two-stage least squares estimates. The dependent variable is ln(TFP).
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Table 2.7: List of Countries in the Sample
Argentina Estonia Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Armenia Fiji Lithuania Senegal
Australia Finland Luxembourg Serbia
Austria France Macao Sierra Leone
Bahrain Gabon Malaysia Singapore
Barbados Germany Malta Slovakia
Belgium Greece Mauritania Slovenia
Benin Guatemala Mauritius South Africa
Bolivia Honduras Mexico Spain
Botswana Hong Kong Moldova Sri Lanka
Brazil Hungary Mongolia Swaziland
Bulgaria Iceland Morocco Sweden
Burundi India Mozambique Switzerland
Cameroon Indonesia Namibia Taiwan
Canada Iran Netherlands Tajikistan
Central African Republic Iraq New Zealand Tanzania
Chile Ireland Niger Thailand
China Israel Norway Togo
Colombia Italy Panama Trinidad And Tobago
Costa Rica Jamaica Paraguay Tunisia
Cote D’Ivoire Japan Peru Turkey
Croatia Jordan Philippines Ukraine
Cyprus Kazakhstan Poland United Kingdom
Czech Republic Kenya Portugal United States
Denmark Korea Qatar Uruguay
Dominican Republic Kuwait Romania Venezuela




Barriers to International Mobility and
Technology Diffusion
Barriers to international mobility are the critical factors to impede the process of interna-
tional technology diffusion. Using bilateral visa restrictions data from 30 host and 198 home
countries over the period of 2001-2012, this paper shows that the international technology
gap increases as the barriers to international mobility increase. These results are robust
across three different measures of visa restrictions and even after taking care of econometric
problem of endogeneity. The results suggest that visa facilitation programs by advanced
countries could promote international technology diffusion.
3.1 Introduction
There remain significant differences in total factor productivity (TFP) across countries.1
Some researchers believe that productivity differs across countries because of the slow process
of international technology diffusion.2 This paper follows the previous research and assumes
that technologies diffuse across countries when societies interact with other societies.3 This
exposure helps societies to adopt advanced technologies and new ideas prevailing in a foreign
space.
1see Caselli (2005), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), and Hall and Jones (1999)
2see Howitt (2000) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005)
3see for example Keller (2004)
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However, not all societies enjoy an equal exposure to foreign space, which depends on the
citizenship of the travelers and their destination countries. The U.S. citizens, for example,
have visa free access to 155 countries, whereas Pakistani citizens have visa free access to
27 countries.4 More passport power gives its holder easy access to more foreign space, to a
larger stock of knowledge, and to superior technologies abroad. On the other hand, barriers
to international mobility reduce the exchange of tourists, businessmen, and students across
countries. Which slows down the process of international technology diffusion.
This paper sheds light on the slow process of international technology diffusion and
advances the existing literature in the following ways. First, this paper analyzes the effects
of barriers to international mobility on technology diffusion across countries, a topic not
investigated heavily in economic literature. Most of the earlier research analyzes the effects
of barriers to mobility on cross-country tourism and international trade.5 Second, this paper
features bilateral TFP gap as the dependent variable, calculated as the absolute difference
between the TFP of the home and the host country, which helps to further explore the
effects of bilateral factors, such as geographical distance and common spoken language, on
the bilateral TFP gap.
Third, earlier research uses a dummy variable as a measure of international barriers to
mobility, which indicates whether a visa is required to enter a country or not; whereas, this
paper uses visa refusal rate as the main measure of barriers to international mobility. The
visa refusal rate is calculated as the number of visas refused divided by the total number
of applications received. To check the robustness of the results, two additional measures of
barriers to mobility, visa restriction index and visa requirement index, are also used. The
data for visa refusal rate, visa restriction index, and visa requirement index are taken from
Hobolth (2012).
Visa refusal rate, compared to the other two measures of barriers to mobility, shows
the intensity of barriers to mobility from the home to the host country. For example, if
4see www.passportindex.org for the latest ranking of passports and Lawson and Lemke (2012) for a nice
exposition to the political economy of visa restrictions.
5For example, Neumayer (2010) finds that visa requirements decrease business travel and tourism. Neu-
mayer (2011) also finds that visa requirements reduce bilateral trade and foreign direct investment. Similarly,
Lawson and Roychoudhury (2013) estimate that visa requirements reduce inbound travel.
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the citizens of two countries need a visa to travel to a host country, the citizens of the
first country may get a visa very easily while excessive paperwork may be required for the
citizens of the second country, where the majority of the visas are denied. Thus, the barriers
to mobility will be higher for the second country. The second measure of barriers to mobility
is visa restriction index, which encompasses three dimensions of barriers to mobility: (1)
whether citizens of the home country need a visa to enter the host country, (2) the intensity
of visa restrictions, and (3) whether a visa application can be submitted in the country of
origin or not. Hobolth (2012) constructs this index on a scale that ranges from 0 to 3, to
simplify the results this paper merges and uses only two categories: no barriers to mobility
and barriers to mobility. Visa requirement index, the third measure of barriers to mobility,
is a dummy variable and indicates whether citizens of the home country need a visa to enter
the host country.
To investigate the association between barriers to international mobility and technology
diffusion, this paper uses bilateral data of 30 host OECD and 198 home countries over the
period of 2001-2012. Empirically, the visa refusal rate may be endogenous with the TFP
gap. A low TFP home (developing) country may face high barriers to mobility from high
TFP host (advanced) countries. In this case, we may have a reverse causality issue. The
advanced countries may impose high barriers to mobility on the citizens of the developing
country to stop illegal immigration. To address this issue, this paper uses genetic distance
as an instrumental variable for visa refusal rate. Genetic distance is the probability that two
randomly selected individuals from two populations will be different. The genetic distance
between two populations is zero if and only if the two populations are identical.6 The data for
genetic distance are taken from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). The underlying assumption
is that genetic dissimilarity (a larger genetic distance between two populations) increases
mistrust between populations7 and, hence, increases barriers to international mobility. A
further concern is that current genetic distance may be correlated with the TFP gap. This
may be due to the factors such as migration. For example, European colonizers settled in
6see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) for a complete exposition to genetic distance and its effect on barriers
to technology transfer.
7 see for example Guiso et al. (2009).
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the regions suitable to them. This migration pattern may explain not only the TFP gap
but also the genetic distance between populations today. This paper, therefore, uses genetic
distance in 1500 as an instrumental variable for current genetic distance. Because, genetic
distance in 1500 is from the period prior to industrial revolution and great migration, we
can argue that genetic distance in 1500 does not affect bilateral TFP gap today.
This paper estimates the causal relationship between barriers to international mobility
and bilateral TFP gap using different estimation methods: panel OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS, and
logit model. In panel OLS settings, the bilateral TFP gap shows an elasticity of 0.04 percent
with respect to the visa refusal rate, while this elasticity is 0.54 and 0.38 in 2SLS and 3SLS
settings, respectively. The average visa refusal rate in the sample is about 12 percent. The
average visa refusal rate, for top 20 most restricted countries, is about 40 percent. This
indicates that the TFP gap is increasing in the range of 15-21 percent for these countries.
The other two additional measures of barriers to mobility, visa restriction index and
visa requirement index, show the same results. The visa restriction index shows that if the
partner country imposes barriers to mobility on the citizens of the home country, the TFP
gap between the country pair increases by about 0.08 percent. The visa requirement index
indicates that if the partner country changes its policy from a visa free to a visa required
country, the TFP gap between the country pair increases by about 0.08 percent.
To further test the robustness of the results this paper converts the dependent variable,
TFP gap, into a dummy variable. This dummy variable shows whether TFP gap between a
country pair exists. This specification is then estimated using the logit model. The results
indicate that if the visa refusal rate increases by 1 percent, there is 12 percent more chance
that the home country has lower productivity relative to the partner country. This paper,
hence, sheds light on the slow diffusion of international technologies by arguing that barriers
to international mobility hinder international technology diffusion.
This paper is related to the economic literature, which has explored the effects of human
interaction on technology diffusion (Lucas, 1988; Irwin and Klenow, 1994; Foster and Rosen-
zweig, 1995; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Agrawal et al., 2006; Andersen and Dalgaard, 2011;
Tani and Joyeux, 2013; Hovhannisyan and Keller, 2015). However, this paper is different
from the above as it tests the flip-side of the Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) and Tani and
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Joyeux (2013) argument; what are the effects of barriers to international human interaction
(international mobility) on technology diffusion?
This paper is also related to the economic literature, which investigates the effects of
barriers to mobility on international trade, foreign direct investment, and tourism. For ex-
ample, Neumayer (2010) finds that visa requirements decrease business travel and tourism.
Neumayer (2011) also finds that visa requirements reduce bilateral trade and foreign direct
investment. Similarly, Lawson and Roychoudhury (2013) estimate that visa requirements
reduce inbound travel. However, the effects of international barriers to mobility on inter-
national technology diffusion are not explored in this literature, and this paper fills this
gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 explores the channels through
which barriers to mobility could affect technology diffusion; Section 3.3 discusses the trends in
international travel and barriers to mobility; Section 3.4 presents a brief history of passports
and visas; Section 3.5 describes the data; Section 3.6 presents empirical methodology and
results; and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 How Do Barriers to Mobility Affect International
Technology Diffusion?
This section explores different types of barriers to mobility that international travelers
face, and then explores the link between barriers to mobility and international technology
diffusion. International travelers face barriers to mobility in different forms, either in the
form of requiring a visa before the physical entry into a host country, or in the form of a high
visa rejection rate.8 Most international travelers require a valid visa before entering a foreign
space. A visa is defined as a “document issued in the country of origin (or residence) of the
individual by the authorities of the state to which he or she wishes to go” (Guild, 2009).
National states have always had the monopoly over who can enter or exit their national
8For natural barriers to international mobility, for example geography, see Gallup et al. (1999) and
Diamond (1999).
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borders. Most democratic states use this monopoly for economic and political reasons9 and
exercise exit control only for a few cases.10 Autocratic and repressive regimes, on the other
hand, may use this monopoly, specifically, for political reasons: to prevent entry and exit of
their opponents and ordinary citizens.11 These regimes may use this monopoly to subsidize
the political threats and extend their own political power (La Porta et al., 1999). This paper,
however, ignores the exit control and discusses the more ubiquitous case: controlling and
restricting the foreigners to enter in the national borders.
Barriers to mobility can also take the form of a high visa refusal rate; a state can refuse to
share its space with a foreigner. In 2015, the U.S. refused 3.1 million non-immigrant visas,12
a visa refusal rate of about 22 percent. Among these were 0.25 million student visas13 and 2.2
million business visas. The average visa refusal rate in the sample is about 12 percent. The
average visa refusal rate for top 20 most restricted home countries is about 40 percent, with
Somalia having average visa refusal rate of about 60 percent. Each visa refusal represents a
missed learning or business opportunity for these countries and disconnects them from the
rest of the world, consequently hindering the personal interaction and technology transfer
towards the home countries.
How do barriers to mobility affect technology diffusion across countries? Barriers to mo-
bility impede human interaction, which is a key source to diffuse international technologies.14
Human interaction is required to transmit a part of knowledge that cannot be codified. Re-
search shows that human interaction increases the chance of doing business and promotes
international trade.15 Frankel and Romer (1999) associate greater human interaction with
more international trade.16 Barriers to mobility, on the other hand, impede business travel
9see Lawson and Lemke (2012) for an exposition to the political economy of visas.
10For example, to prevent high profile criminals to flee from the country during the trial.
11The East Germany, in recent history, is an extreme example of exit control by a repressive regime.
12https://travel.state.gov
13Student visas include visa applications in the category of F1 and J1
14see, for example, Lucas (1988) and Irwin and Klenow (1994) provide the same notion. See Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995), Almeida and Kogut (1999), and Agrawal et al. (2006) for empirical evidence in favor of
knowledge diffusion by personal contact.
15For example, Cristea (2011) argues that personal human interaction promotes international trade and
Oxford Economics (2012) argues that human interaction improves the chances of doing business with
foreigners.
16Transfer of technology via international trade has been extensively studied in the economic literature,
see for example, Engelbrecht (1997), Keller (1998), Edmond (2001), and Lee (2006)
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and subsequently prevent technologies to diffuse across countries.
Business trips increase human interaction with foreigners and help firms to obtain knowl-
edge about international technologies, learn new ideas, and organizational strategies from
their partner, which can increase their productivity. Tani and Joyeux (2013) argue that
businessmen are highly educated individuals and international business trips help them ac-
cess the knowledge produced somewhere else. Similarly, Dowrick and Tani (2011) associate
international business trips with higher productivity gains for Australian firms, and these
gains benefit firms in both countries. Hovhannisyan and Keller (2015) find that international
business trips promote local innovation, patenting, and growth for both countries.
Only a fraction of countries invest in R&D and innovate new products and processes and
these innovations and technologies transfer to other countries through international trade and
international mobility of people (Keller, 2004). Oettl and Agrawal (2008) and Kim et al.
(2009) find that the movement of researchers promotes exchange of scientific knowledge
among countries. Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) and Tani and Joyeux (2013) find that
international travel promotes technology diffusion and productivity growth. Similarly, Le
(2008, 2012) finds that knowledge diffuses across countries due to the mobility of highly
skilled workers. If international mobility promotes technology diffusion, then any barriers to
mobility across borders obstruct technology transfer.
Barriers to international mobility also impose additional cost of time and resources to
the travelers; travelers must go through a lot of paper work, submit an application, pay
a visa fee, and wait for a visa before traveling. This process also carries the uncertainty
that a traveler may not get a visa from the host country. This increased cost along with
the uncertainty decreases the flow of people among countries. As we saw above, business
trips promote international trade. Business visas are generally granted for one year and the
process takes several months, which can delay business and give comparative advantage to
the firms located in countries requiring no visa to enter the potential market.
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3.3 Trends in International Travel and Barriers to Mo-
bility
People travel abroad for a variety of reasons including, vacation, business, academic,
religious work, performing athletic or artistic work, medical treatment, etc. International
travel data shows a strong increasing trend during 1995-2012 and is expected to increase
by 3.3 percent a year from 2010 to 2030.17 About 1.60 billion people crossed international
borders in 2012 compared to 0.85 billion in 1995. This shows an increase of 86 percent in
the total number of international travelers from 1995 to 2012.
International travel data also reveals regional variations. In 2012, the travel share of
Europe and Central Asia was about 56 percent; the share of East Asia and the Pacific was
about 22 percent; the share of Middle East and North Africa was about 4 percent; the share
of Latin America and the Caribbean was about 4 percent; the share of South Asia was about
1.57 percent; and the share of Sub-Saharan Africa was 1.52 percent.
The distribution of international travel based on the income level of the home country
also shows the same dispersion. In 2012, high income countries had the largest share in
international travel (about 79 percent), followed by upper middle income countries (14 per-
cent), lower middle income countries (6 percent), and low income countries (1 percent). This
shows that rich countries have access to more foreign space compared to the poor countries.
The data for barriers to international mobility also show huge variation across countries.
Table A2 shows the 20 most powerful and the 20 weakest passports in the world.18 The
ranking of a passport is based on the the ability of the passport holder to travel to other
countries without requiring a prior visa. The list puts the German passport at the top with
158 visa free entries. The weakest passport list has Afghanistan at the top with only 24 visa
free entries.
17see The UNWTO Tourism Highlights 2013 at http://www.e-unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/9789284415427
18see https://www.passportindex.org for the complete list.
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3.4 A Brief History of Barriers to Mobility
Almost all states control the entry and exit of travelers at their national borders. This
entry and exit is governed using passport, visa, and other identity documents. Some states
use passport as a political instrument—to restrict travel across countries. For example,
Israeli citizens need special permission to travel to Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.19 Similarly, Israeli passport holders are not accepted in
some countries.20 A most recent example of travel restrictions is the US executive order
number 13769, signed by president Donald J. Trump on January 27, 2017. This order
suspended the entry of travelers from seven countries in the US for 90 days.21 These types
of travel restrictions and passport control are not new.
The oldest reference to a passport is found in the Hebrew Bible, in the book of Nehemiah.
Nehemiah was a cup-bearer of the King Artaxerxes, the king of Persia (455 BC). Nehemiah
wanted to travel to Judah to build a wall in Jerusalem. He asked the king of Persia to write
him a letter so that the governors of the provinces across the river may allow him to pass
through their territory safely. These types of letters became popular in Europe during the
reign of King Louis XIV in 17th century. However, this system was completely abolished
before WWI due to the arrival of a train system in Europe. The train system increased the
volume of tourism as well as administration cost of visas and passport in Europe.
The travel restrictions were re-introduced after the WWI among the warring states
(France, Germany, and Italy). Other neutral states such as Spain, Denmark, and Switzerland
followed. There was always an effort to revert to a pre-war passport and visa free world. To
achieve this goal, the first passport conference was held in Paris in 1920. This goal could not
be achieved as the political conditions of the world had changed dramatically since WWI.
The discussion of a visa free world remained till 1962, although passports and visas became
new normal after WWII.
19These states, under Israeli law, are designated as “enemy states”.
20Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
21 The countries included in this list are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.
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3.5 Data
This section presents data description and data sources in detail. Annual bilateral data
of 198 home countries and 30 OECD host countries22 during the period 2001-2012 is used in
this study.
TFP Gap: TFP Gap is the total factor productivity gap between the host country j and
the home country i at time t. It is calculated as the absolute difference between the TFP of
the home and the host country.
TFP Gapi,jt = |ln(TFPj,t)− ln(TFPi,t)|
Notice that if TFPi = TFPj then the TFP gap will be zero. This paper uses an improved
measure of TFP23 reported in the Penn World Table version 8.1 (PWT 8.1). PWT 8.1
reports TFP accounting for variable labor share in GDP and variable depreciation rates
across countries.24 PWT 8.1 data are different from earlier studies, for example, Hall and
Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) constructed TFP by assuming a constant depreciation rate
across countries and over time.






where GDPi is the real GDP of the home country and GDPUSA is the real GDP of the base
country, the U.S. Qi,USA is the Tornqvist quantity index of factor inputs. It is the second















Here α is the output elasticity of capital, K is capital, and L is labor in the respective
country.
Visa Refusal Rate: The visa refusal rate is calculated as the number of visas refused
divided by the total number of applications received. The data for visa refusal rate are
22see list of countries in the appendix.
23variable ’ctfp’ in Penn World Table version 8.1.
24see Inklaar and Timmer (2013) and Feenstra et al. (2015) for a complete discussion
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taken from Hobolth (2012). This variable shows the intensity of barriers to mobility and,
to the author’s opinion, a better indicator of barriers to mobility. Visa requirement index
shows whether the visa is required to enter a country or not but does not show the extent of
barriers to mobility. If the citizens of two countries need a visa to travel to a host country,
the citizens of the first country may get a visa very easily while excessive paper work may
be required for the citizens of the second country, where most of the visas are denied. Thus,
the barriers to mobility will be higher for the second country. Data for visa refusal rate are
available for the period of 2001-2012.
Visa Restriction Index: This index is constructed by Hobolth (2012) and covers three
dimensions of the barriers to mobility: visa requirements, visa issuing practice, and consular
services. Visa requirement shows whether citizens of the home country need a visa to enter
the host country or not. The visa issuing practice shows the intensity of restrictions and
how many visas were granted as a share of total applications, and the consular service shows
whether a visa application can be submitted in the home country. All the above three
dimensions are given equal weight to calculate this index. This index is reported on a scale
ranging from 0 to 3, where 0 implies no barriers to mobility from the home country to the
host country, and 3 implies high barriers to mobility from the home to the host country. To
simplify the results, this paper uses only two categories: no barriers to mobility and barriers
to mobility by merging the categories.
Visa Requirement Index: This index shows whether the citizens of the home country
need a valid visa to enter the host country. This index is a binary variable and takes the
value of 1 if the citizens of the home country require a visa to enter the host country and 0
otherwise. The data for this dummy variable are taken from Hobolth (2012).
Institutional Gap: This paper uses polity iv index as a measure of institution quality
in a country, normalizing this index on a scale ranging from 0 to 1,25 where 0 indicates
weak institutions and 1 indicates better quality institutions. The variable institution gap is
calculated as the difference between the institution quality in the host and home country.
Polity IV is reported by Center for Systemic Peace. Some economists believe that the
Polity index, compared to other measures of institutions, is a better measure of institution
25Spilimbergo (2009) and Barro (1999) also normalize this index on a scale ranging from 0 to 1.
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quality. The argument is that it shows the constraint on the executive while other measures
of institutions are policy outcomes (Glaeser et al., 2004). The Polity IV dataset covers all
major and independent states over the period 1800-2012 and reports polity scores on a scale
ranging from -10 to 10, where 10 indicates a consolidated democracy and -10 indicates an
autocracy.
Common Spoken Language (CSL): CSL is the probability that two individuals selected
at random from two countries will understand each other. The value of CSL lies between
0 and 1, where 0 indicates that the probability is zero that the pair will understand each
other and 1 indicates that the probability that the pair will understand each other is one.
The data for CSL are taken from CEPII.26
Capital Intensity Gap: This variable is calculated as the difference between the capital
stock of the host and the home country. This variable captures the stock of knowledge in a
country. Capital stock27 (millions of US dollar at constant prices) data are taken from Penn
World Table version 8.1.
Other Variables: Other variables include physical distance between a country pair, ge-
netic distance, and a dummy variable showing whether two countries share a common
WTO/GATT status. Genetic distance is the probability that two randomly selected individ-
uals from two populations will be different. The genetic distance between two populations
is zero if and only if the two populations are identical. Data for genetic distance are taken
from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). Data for physical distance and common WTO status
are taken from CEPII.
3.6 Empirical Analysis
3.6.1 Partial Correlations
Figure 3.1 plots the average TFP gap and average visa refusal rate of each country during
the sample period. Visually, the average TFP gap and average visa refusal rate show a high
positive correlation. Table 3.2 presents a quick view of partial correlations between the
26see Melitz and Toubal (2014) for a complete exploration.
27variable ’rkna’ in PWT 8.1.
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dependent variable, TFP gap, and the regressors. The correlation coefficient between the
bilateral TFP gap and visa refusal rate is 0.43. The correlation coefficient between bilateral
TFP gap and the other two measures of barriers to mobility, visa restriction index and visa
requirement index, is 0.38. This provides the first evidence that barriers to mobility slow
down the process of technology diffusion across countries.
3.6.2 Specification
The next step is to explore empirical evidence in favor of the causal relationship between
the TFP gap and barriers to international mobility. In that respect, this paper features
the percent gap between the total factor productivity of a country pair as the dependent
variable and barriers to international mobility as the main explanatory variable. Other key
factors that affect bilateral technology diffusion include difference between the institutions
and difference between capital intensity in a country pair. Institutions are important be-
cause if the property rights are not secured, powerful groups may prevent the adoption of
new technologies due to the fear of losing economic and political influence (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2001; Parente and Prescott, 1999). In this case, many producers will not be willing
to adopt new technologies. On the other hand, good institutions decrease the transaction
cost (North, 1990) and stimulate economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Dawson, 1998;
Acemoglu et al., 2002; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
Technology diffusion also depends on the geographic location of a country; countries in
the proximity to the technological hubs may adopt more technologies due to a lower trans-
portation cost.28 This paper uses distance between a country pair to account for this factor.
Technology transfer also depends on the volume of international trade and foreign direct
investment.29 This paper uses common WTO/GATT status to account for international
trade and foreign direct investment. Finally, language can play a key role in the diffusion
of technologies across countries. Countries speaking the same language may share more
technologies due to the ease of communication.
To account for the above determinants of technology diffusion, this paper uses institution
28see Gallup et al. (1999).
29see Keller (2004) for a complete discussion.
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gap (the difference between the institution quality in a country pair), capital intensity gap
(the difference between the capital stock of two countries), the physical distance between
two countries, common spoken language, and common WTO status as control variables.
Specifically, the following model is used
TFP Gapi,jt = β0 + β1 Barriers to Mobilityi,jt +X
′
i,jt β2 + εijt (3.1)
where the TFP Gap is the absolute total factor productivity gap between the host country
j and the home country i at time t. It is defined as
TFP Gapi,jt = |ln(TFPj,t)− ln(TFPi,t)|
Notice that if TFPi = TFPj then the TFP gap will be zero.
Barriers to Mobilityi,jt indicate the barriers to mobility faced by the citizens of coun-
try i from country j in year t. To account for barriers to mobility, this paper uses three
measures: visa refusal rate, visa restriction index, and visa requirement index. Xi,jt is
a vector of control variables containing institution gap (Institution Gapi,jt), distance be-
tween ith and jth country (Distancei,j), difference in the capital intensity in a country
pair (Capital Intensity Gapi,jt), dummy variable indicating whether ith and jth coun-
tries have a common WTO/GATT status (Common WTO Statusi,jt), and the probabil-
ity that two randomly selected individuals from two countries speak the same language
(Common Spoken Language). Finally, εijt captures the omitted variables and noise.
3.6.3 OLS Estimation
Table 3.3 shows OLS estimates for TFP gap as a dependent variable and visa refusal rate
as the main explanatory variable. Column 1-3 reports estimation results for visa refusal rate
as the only explanatory variable. Column 1 does not include any time and country fixed
effects. Column 2 adds time fixed effects and column 3 adds time fixed effects, host country
fixed effects, and home country fixed effects. Visa refusal rate explains about 19 percent of
the variation in the dependent variable in column 1, 13 percent in column 2, and 92 percent
of the variation in column 3. Visa refusal rate has a positive and statistically significant
coefficient in column 1-3.
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Column 4-7 present the estimation results for visa refusal rate, as the main explanatory
variable, and include other control variables in the model. The explanatory power of this
model is in the range of 11 to 21 percent. The main explanatory variable, visa refusal rate,
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient with an elasticity of about about 0.04,
indicating that 10 percent increase in the visa refusal rate increases bilateral TFP gap by
0.40 percent. Starting from the zero bilateral TFP gap, if visa refusal rate increases by 10
percent, the bilateral TFP gap increases from 0 to about 0.40 percent. The average visa
refusal rate in the sample is about 12 percent. This indicates that the average bilateral TFP
gap is increasing by about 0.48 percent due to the visa refusal rate. The average annual visa
refusal rate for the top 20 most restricted countries is about 40 percent. This shows that
the TFP gap is increasing by about 1.6 percent for these countries. The average TFP gap
in the sample is about 14 percent. This implies that the TFP gap, on average, will increase
from 14 to 14.40 percent due to visa refusal rate.
To check the robustness of the results two additional measures of barriers to mobility,
visa restriction index and visa requirement index, are also used. The estimation results for
these two measures of barriers to mobility are presented in table 3.4. Column 1 presents
visa restriction index as the main explanatory variable. Visa restriction index is a dummy
variable, where 0 implies no barriers and 1 implies barriers to mobility from the home to
the host country. Visa restriction index explains about 20 percent of the variation in the
dependent variable and has a positive and statistically significant coefficient with a value
of 0.08. Starting from the zero bilateral TFP gap, if the host country imposes barriers to
mobility on the home country, the bilateral TFP gap becomes about 0.08 percent.
Column 2 presents visa requirement index as the main explanatory variable. Visa re-
quirement index is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 if a visa is required to travel
from the home to the host country. Visa requirement index explains about 20 percent of the
variation in the dependent variable and has a positive and statistically significant coefficient
with a value of 0.08. To quantify the magnitude of visa requirement, let’s start from a zero
bilateral TFP gap. If the host country switches from a visa free country to visa required
country, the bilateral TFP gap increases to about 0.08 percent.
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3.6.4 IV Estimation
Dealing with Endogeneity
A concern is that the visa refusal rate may be endogenous with TFP gap in the above
model. A low TFP home (developing country) may face high barriers to mobility from a high
TFP (advanced) host country. In this case, we have a reverse causality issue. The advanced
country may impose high barriers to mobility on the citizens of the developing country to
stop illegal immigration. To address this issue, this paper uses genetic distance as an instru-
mental variable for visa refusal rate. Genetic distance is the probability that two randomly
selected individuals from two populations will be different. The genetic distance between
two populations is zero if and only if the two populations are identical.30 The underlying
assumption is that genetic dissimilarity (a larger genetic distance between two populations)
increases mistrust between populations31 and, hence, increases barriers to international mo-
bility. A further concern is that current genetic distance may be correlated with the TFP
gap. This may be due to the factors such as migration. For example, European colonizers
settled in the regions suitable to them. This migration pattern may explain not only the
current TFP gap but also the genetic distance between populations today.
These issues are resolved using 3SLS model. In the first stage, this paper uses genetic
distance in 1500 AD as an instrumental variable for current genetic distance. The fitted
values of current genetic distance are then used as an instrument for visa refusal rate in our
main model. Genetic distance in 1500 AD is from the period prior to industrial revolution
and great migration. We can argue that genetic distance in 1500 AD does not affect bilateral
TFP gap today. More specifically, the below 3SLS model is estimated.
TFP Gapi,jt = β0 + β1 ln(V isa Refusal Ratei,jt) +X
′
i,jt β2 + εijt (3.2)
V isa Refusal Ratei,jt = γ0 + γ1 Genetic Distancei,j + ηijt (3.3)
Genetic Distancei,j = λ0 + λ1 Genetic Distance
1500AD
i,j + φij (3.4)
30see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) for a complete exposition to genetic distance and its effect on barriers
to technology transfer.
31 see for example Guiso et al. (2009).
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First-stage Estimation
Table 3.5 shows the correlation between endogenous variables. The correlation coefficient
between current genetic distance and genetic distance in 1500 is 0.73. Table 3.6 shows
that the genetic distance in 1500 explains about 53 percent of the variation in current
genetic distance among countries. The coefficient for genetic distance in 1500 is statistically
significant and positive. Table 3.5 and 3.6 also show that the correlation coefficient between
visa refusal rate and current genetic distance is 0.42. Current genetic distance explains
about 20 percent of the variation in the visa refusal rate and has a positive and statistically
significant coefficient value. These results and F-test confirm the validity of the instruments.
IV Estimation Results
Table 3.7 reports 2LS and 3SLS estimates for TFP gap as a dependent variable and visa
refusal rate as an independent variable. Column 1 reports 2SLS estimation results. Current
genetic distance between countries is used as an instrumental variable for visa refusal rate in
this model. Visa refusal rate has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Starting
from the zero bilateral TFP gap, if visa refusal rate increases by one percent, the bilateral
TFP gap increases from 0 to about 0.54 percent. Column 2 reports 3SLS results for TFP gap
as a dependent variable. Genetic distance in 1500 is used as an instrument for current genetic
distance. The fitted values of current genetic distance are then used as an instrumental
variable for visa refusal rate. Using this model, we were able to isolate the effects of European
migration and industrial revolution on current TFP gap and barriers to mobility. Visa refusal
rate has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in this model. The coefficient value
for visa refusal rate is about 30 percent lower from the 2SLS coefficient (0.54 vs. 0.38) and
about 10 times larger than the OLS (0.04 vs. 0.38). Nevertheless, the statistical significance
of visa refusal rate supports the hypothesis that barriers to international mobility slow down
the process of international technology diffusion.
To quantify the magnitude of 2SLS and 3SLS coefficients, let’s start from the zero bilateral
TFP gap, if visa refusal rate increases by 10 percent, the bilateral TFP gap increases between
3.8 to 5.4 percent. The average visa refusal rate in the sample is about 12 percent. This
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indicates that the average bilateral TFP gap increases in the range of 4 to 5 percent due to
the visa refusal rate. The average TFP gap in the sample is about 14 percent. This implies
that the TFP gap, on average, will increase from 14 to 19 percent due to visa refusal rate.
Controlling for Other Factors: Other control variables in the model show expected
and robust coefficients across all three measures of barriers to mobility and across different
estimation methods: OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS. Variable institution gap, showing bilateral dif-
ference in the institutional arrangements, has a positive and statistically significant effect on
the TFP gap. This indicates the important role of institutions in the diffusion of technologies.
Capital intensity gap has a positive and statistically significant coefficient value. Distance
between the home and the host country has a positive effect on the TFP gap. This indicates
that geographic location is very important for technology diffusion; countries located near
the technology hubs have a higher technology adoption rate. Finally, common spoken lan-
guage and common WTO status have negative coefficient values. Common language shows
the ease of communication which facilitates the diffusion of technologies. Common WTO
status captures the effect of international trade and foreign direct investment. The results
show that countries with a high volume of bilateral trade and foreign direct investment, on
average, have lower TFP gap.
3.6.5 Logit Model Estimation
To further test the robustness of the results, the dependent variable is turned into a
dummy variable. This variable takes the value of 1 whenever host country has a higher TFP
than the home country, and 0 otherwise i.e.
TFP Gap =
 1, if TFPjt > TFPit0, otherwise (3.5)
As the dependent variable is a binary variable, the logit model can estimate this model. The
results, in table 3.8, indicate that if the visa refusal rate increases by one percent, there is 12
percent more chance that the home country has lower TFP relative to the partner country (a
high TFP gap). The results for the other two measures of barriers to mobility indicate that
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if the home country faces barriers to mobility from the partner country, it is 30 percent more
likely to have lower TFP relative to the partner country. Similarly, if the visa is required to
travel to the partner country there is a 30 percent more chance that home country has lower
TFP relative to the partner country.
A country is 40 percent more likely to have a lower TFP relative to its partner, if its
institutions are weak relative to the partner country. A country is about 8 percent less
likely to have a TFP gap if it shares common WTO status with the partner country. A one
percent increase in the capital intensity difference between a country pair implies 5 percent
more likelihood of a bilateral TFP gap. A one percent increase in the distance between a
country pair implies 9 percent more likelihood of a bilateral TFP gap.
To summarize the above results, overall evidence suggests that there is a strong relation-
ship between barriers to international mobility and technology diffusion. The international
TFP gap increases as the barrier to international mobility increases. The results are robust
across three measures of barriers to mobility as well as across different estimation techniques.
Hence, this paper sheds light on the slow diffusion of international technologies.32
3.7 Concluding Remarks
International mobility plays a key role in exposing societies to superior technologies and
production processes outside their national borders and, hence, facilitates the diffusion of
technologies. On the other hand, any barriers to international mobility can slow down the
spread of technologies across countries. This paper uses bilateral visa restrictions data of 30
host countries and 198 home countries between 2001-2012 to investigate the implications of
barriers to mobility on international technology diffusion. The results indicate that barriers
to international mobility impede the spread of technologies across countries. Barriers to
international mobility have a statistically significant and positive effect on bilateral TFP
gap. The visa refusal rate shows that the TFP gap among countries increases as the visa
refusal rate increases. Hence, this paper builds a case that the international TFP gap
32Although this paper does not study TFP convergence directly, I checked the robustness of the results
by using the system GMM. The results show that visa refusal rate has a statistically significant effect on the
growth of TFP gap. The results are available on request.
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increases as the barrier to international mobility increases. These results are robust across
all three measures of barriers to mobility.
Important policy implications include initiating visa facilitation programs with advanced
countries. These visa facilitation program will promote cultural and scientific exchange and
stimulate technology diffusion across countries. The present paper focuses on the one-way
effects of barriers to mobility—technology diffusion from the host to the home country. The
future research could incorporate two-way effects to explore, how the bilateral barriers to
mobility affect bilateral technology diffusion.
3.8 Appendix
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Notes: Averages are based on the visa refusal rate data from Hobolth (2012).
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Average Refusal Rate Average TFP Gap
Notes: Averages are based on the visa refusal rate data from Hobolth (2012) and TFP data from PWT 8.1.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
ln(% TFP Gapi,jt) 21,956.00 1.33 0.67 0.31 7.47
ln(Visa Refusal Ratei,jt) 17,357.00 1.01 1.32 0.00 4.62
Visa Restriction Indexi,jt 13,453.00 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Visa Requirement Indexi,jt 13,453.00 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Institution Gapi,jt 19,551.00 0.78 0.28 -0.10 1.00
ln(Capital Intensity Gapi,jt) 21,956.00 2.23 1.63 0.00 8.65
ln(Income Differencei,jt) 21,956.00 2.15 1.56 0.00 8.47
ln(Distancei,j) 20,796.00 8.29 0.95 5.08 9.88
Common Spoken Languagei,j 21,018.00 0.22 0.25 0.00 1.00
Common WTO Statusi,jt 21,956.00 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00
Genetic Distancei,j 61,661.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.07
Genetic Distance in 1500 ADi,j 61,661.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.08
Imran Arif Chapter 3. Barriers to International Mobility and Technology Diffusion 83
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix
ln(% TFP Gapi,jt) 1.00
ln(Visa Refusal Ratei,jt) 0.43 1.00
Visa Requirement Indexi,jt 0.38 0.82 1.00
Visa Restriction Indexi,jt 0.38 0.82 1.00 1.00
Institution Gapi,jt -0.14 -0.48 -0.56 -0.56 1.00
ln(Capital Intensity Gapi,jt) 0.32 0.26 0.20 0.20 -0.13 1.00
ln(Income Differencei,jt) 0.28 0.21 0.16 0.16 -0.10 0.95 1.00
ln(Distancei,j) 0.23 0.20 0.34 0.34 -0.17 0.17 0.15 1.00
Common Spoken Languagei,j -0.20 -0.31 -0.46 -0.46 0.37 -0.01 0.04 -0.37 1.00
Common WTO Statusi,jt -0.06 -0.18 -0.26 -0.26 0.34 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.16 1.00
ln(Genetic Distancei,j) 0.42 0.42 0.48 0.48 -0.25 0.26 0.22 0.63 -0.35 0.09 1.00
ln(Genetic Distance in 1500 ADi,j) 0.27 0.18 0.25 0.25 -0.04 0.22 0.20 0.83 -0.28 0.13 0.73 1.00
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Table 3.3: Dependent Variable: Bilateral TFP Gap (percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ln(Visa Refusal Ratei,jt) 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.016*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Institution Gapi,jt 0.167*** 0.247***
(0.034) (0.035)
ln(Capital Intensity Gapi,jt) 0.133*** 0.001
(0.012) (0.045)




Common Spoken Languagei,j -0.424***
(0.055)
Common WTO Statusi,jt -0.077**
(0.037)
Observations 17,357 17,357 17,357 17,357 17,357 17,357 17,357
R-squared 0.19 0.13 0.92 0.11 0.20 0.17 0.21
Number of countries 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454
Time Fixed Effect × X X X X X X
Host Country Fixed Effect × × X × × × ×
Home Country Fixed Effect × × X × × × ×
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Ordinary least squares estimates.
The dependent variable is the bilateral total factor productivity gap between the host and the home country. Visa
refusal rate is the number of visa applications denied as a share of total applications. The sample is an unbalanced
panel, comprising annual bilateral data between 2001-2012.
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Visa Restriction Indexi,jt 0.082***
(0.020)
Visa Requirement Indexi,jt 0.080***
(0.020)
Institution Gapi,jt 0.282*** 0.282***
(0.039) (0.039)
ln(Capital Intensity Gapi,jt) -0.015 -0.015
(0.053) (0.053)




Common Spoken Languagei,j -0.529*** -0.530***
(0.065) (0.065)




Number of countries 2,177 2,177
Time Fixed Effect X X
Host Country Fixed Effect × ×
Home Country Fixed Effect × ×
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Ordinary least squares estimates.
The dependent variable is the bilateral total factor produc-
tivity gap between the host and the home country. Visa
restriction index is a dummy variable and take the value of
0 if there are no barriers to mobility from the home to the
host country. Visa Requirement index is a dummy variable
and take the value 1 if visa is required to travel from the
home country to the host country. The sample is an un-
balanced panel, comprising annual bilateral data between
2001-2012.
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Table 3.5: Correlation between Endogenous Variables
(1)
ln(Visa Refusal Ratei,jt) ln(Genetic Distancei,j) ln(Genetic Distance in 1500 ADi,j)
ln(Visa Refusal Ratei,jt) 1.00
ln(Genetic Distancei,j) 0.42 1.00
ln(Genetic Distance in 1500 ADi,j) 0.18 0.73 1.00
Table 3.6: Dependent Variable: ln(Visa Refusal Rate)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Visa Refusal Rate Genetic Distance
ln(Genetic Distancei,j) 34.324***
(0.556)




F First Stage 420.92 1659
Time Fixed Effect X X
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ordinary least squares estimates. The dependent variable in column 1 is visa refusal
rate and column 2 is current genetic distance. Visa refusal rate is the number of
visa applications denied as a share of total applications. Genetic distance is the
probability that two randomly selected individuals from two populations will be
different. The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising annual bilateral data
between 2001-2012.
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Table 3.7: IV Estimation
(1) (2)
VARIABLES 2SLS 3SLS
ln(Visa Refusal Ratei,jt) 0.536*** 0.378***
(0.014) (0.045)
Institution Gapi,jt 1.022*** 0.145*
(0.032) (0.079)
ln(Capital Intensity Gapi,jt) 0.063*** 0.183***
(0.011) (0.015)




Common Spoken Languagei,j 0.060** -0.235***
(0.026) (0.037)
Common WTO Statusi,jt -0.158*** -0.395***
(0.022) (0.022)
Observations 17,357 17,357
Time Fixed Effect X X
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Two-stage least squares estimates
in column 1. Three-stage least squares estimates in col-
umn 2. The dependent variable is the bilateral total factor
productivity gap between the host and the home country.
Visa refusal rate is the number of visa applications denied
as a share of total applications. Current genetic distance
between a country pair is used as an instrument for visa
refusal rate in column 1. For 3SLS, genetic distance in 1500
AD is used as an instrument for current genetic distance.
The fitted values of current genetic distance are then used
as an instrument for visa refusal rate in column 3. Genetic
distance is the probability that two randomly selected indi-
viduals from two populations will be different. The sample
is an unbalanced panel comprising annual bilateral data be-
tween 2001-2012.
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Table 3.8: Dependent Variable: Does TFP Gap between Country i and
Country j Exist? (Yes=1, No=0)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Logit Model Logit Model Logit Model
ln(Visa Refusal Ratei,jt) 0.116***
(0.004)
Visa Restriction Indexi,jt 0.307***
(0.012)
Visa Requirement Indexi,jt 0.306***
(0.012)
Institution Gapi,jt 0.392*** 0.428*** 0.427***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
ln(Capital Intensity Gapi,jt) 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(Distancei,j) 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.086***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Common Spoken Languagei,j 0.014 0.041** 0.041**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Common WTO Statusi,jt -0.080*** -0.034** -0.034**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 12,631 12,631 12,631
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Logit
model marginal effects at the means. The dependent variable is a binary variable
and indicates whether the bilateral TFP gap exists. Visa refusal rate is the number
of visa applications denied as a share of total applications. Visa restriction index
is a dummy variable and take the value of 0 if there are no barriers to mobility
from the home to the host country. Visa Requirement index is a dummy variable
and take the value 1 if visa is required to travel from the home country to the
































Table A1: Country-wise Average Visa Refusal Rates (2001-2012)
Afghanistan 21.18 Central African Republic 29.54 Greece 9.85 Lesotho 24.78 Norway 7.42 Spain 7.66
Albania 16.41 Chad 22.62 Grenada 26.83 Liberia 56.83 Oman 2.97 Sri Lanka 22.43
Algeria 27.57 Chile 11.70 Guatemala 8.60 Libya 9.74 Pakistan 34.09 Sudan 18.00
Andorra 15.05 China 8.06 Guinea 43.00 Liechtenstein 5.33 Palau 35.17 Suriname 11.25
Angola 15.68 Colombia 15.21 Guinea-Bissau 31.78 Lithuania 7.41 Palestinian Authority 40.71 Swaziland 10.90
Antigua and Barbuda 18.17 Comoros 30.15 Guyana 33.31 Luxembourg 5.69 Panama 6.76 Sweden 8.19
Argentina 13.31 Congo 25.85 Haiti 27.10 Macao SAR 7.92 Papua New Guinea 2.86 Switzerland 3.50
Armenia 16.11 Congo 39.30 Holy See 5.70 Macedonia 12.52 Paraguay 15.14 Syria 23.62
Australia 5.39 Costa Rica 7.94 Honduras 10.40 Madagascar 12.09 Peru 14.54 Taiwan 1.04
Austria 6.97 Cote d’Ivoire 30.50 Hong Kong SAR 3.96 Malawi 12.38 Philippines 14.82 Tajikistan 14.75
Azerbaijan 6.35 Croatia 5.62 Hungary 4.38 Malaysia 15.97 Poland 6.37 Tanzania 11.22
Bahamas 5.75 Cuba 14.17 Iceland 5.17 Maldives 12.67 Portugal 6.67 Thailand 6.77
Bahrain 2.00 Cyprus 12.60 India 13.10 Mali 33.69 Qatar 4.57 Timor-Leste 18.67
Bangladesh 24.85 Czech Republic 6.34 Indonesia 4.78 Malta 7.63 Romania 12.71 Togo 28.60
Barbados 8.43 Denmark 6.59 Iran 16.65 Marshall Islands 9.50 Russia 2.17 Tonga 35.73
Belarus 3.22 Djibouti 28.23 Iraq 15.06 Mauritania 24.81 Rwanda 24.28 Trinidad and Tobago 5.29
Belgium 7.08 Dominica 28.17 Ireland 5.20 Mauritius 9.67 Saint Kitts and Nevis 21.83 Tunisia 16.94
Belize 18.33 Dominican Republic 27.79 Israel 11.30 Mexico 6.55 Saint Lucia 14.08 Turkey 7.83
Benin 26.07 Ecuador 17.50 Italy 8.21 Micronesia 47.17 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 24.17 Turkmenistan 12.26
Bhutan 48.86 Egypt 14.90 Jamaica 18.41 Moldova 13.61 Samoa 30.67 Tuvalu 22.83
Bolivia 14.28 El Salvador 13.09 Japan 4.18 Monaco 11.31 San Marino 8.92 Uganda 17.66
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.18 Equatorial Guinea 8.10 Jordan 12.82 Mongolia 21.91 Sao Tome and Principe 14.62 Ukraine 6.69
Botswana 7.91 Eritrea 27.62 Kazakhstan 3.52 Montenegro 6.37 Saudi Arabia 5.82 United Arab Emirates 8.62
Brazil 10.21 Estonia 3.22 Kenya 15.08 Morocco 23.90 Senegal 33.15 United Kingdom 4.66
Brunei Darussalam 6.74 Ethiopia 22.35 Kiribati 19.33 Mozambique 4.28 Serbia 7.03 United States of America 3.34
Bulgaria 10.27 Fiji 14.86 Korea (North) 8.97 Namibia 5.42 Seychelles 7.95 Uruguay 11.05
Burkina Faso 21.70 Finland 5.86 Korea (South) 15.15 Nauru 32.67 Sierra Leone 37.29 Uzbekistan 11.80
Burma 12.29 France 8.79 Kosovo 24.25 Nepal 25.41 Singapore 4.89 Vanuatu 9.88
Burundi 28.37 Gabon 12.04 Kuwait 2.83 Netherlands 8.66 Slovakia 4.20 Venezuela 12.41
Cambodia 20.11 Gambia 44.79 Kyrgyzstan 20.38 New Zealand 5.00 Slovenia 3.85 Vietnam 11.82
Cameroon 32.82 Georgia 14.48 Laos 22.19 Nicaragua 10.63 Solomon Islands 7.20 Yemen 17.18
Canada 5.53 Germany 6.91 Latvia 5.87 Niger 26.13 Somalia 61.83 Zambia 7.80
Cape Verde 25.67 Ghana 37.24 Lebanon 10.52 Nigeria 37.01 South Africa 3.80 Zimbabwe 9.06
Notes: Averages are calculated using data from Hobolth (2012).
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Table A2: World Passport Ranking
Most Powerful Passports in the World Weakest Passports in the World
Country Number of visa free entries Country Number of visa free entries
Germany 158 Afghanistan 24
Sweden 158 Pakistan 27
Finland 157 Iraq 30
France 157 Somalia 31
Switzerland 157 Syria 32
Spain 157 Bangladesh 35
United Kingdom 157 Iran 35
Denmark 156 Libya 35
Italy 156 South Sudan 36
Netherlands 156 Ethiopia 36
Belgium 156 Sudan 36
South Korea 156 Palestinian Territories 38
Norway 156 Eritrea 38
Singapore 155 Sri Lanka 39
Luxembourg 155 Congo (Dem. Rep.) 39
Austria 155 Nepal 40
Portugal 155 Lebanon 40
United States of America 155 Kosovo 41
Greece 154 North Korea 41
Ireland 154 Yemen 42
Notes: Number of visa free entries indicates the number of countries a passport holder can visit with-
out requiring a visa, or can obtain a visa on arrival. Data for passport power rank are taken from
https://www.passportindex.org
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Table A3: List of Host Countries in the Sample
Austria Lithuania Belgium Luxembourg
Bulgaria Malta Cyprus Netherlands
Czech Rep. Norway Denmark Poland
Estonia Portugal Finland Romania
France Slovakia Germany Slovenia
Greece Spain Hungary Sweden
































Table A4: List of Origin Countries in the Sample
Afghanistan CAR Greece Lesotho Norway Spain
Albania Chad Grenada Liberia Oman Sri Lanka
Algeria Chile Guatemala Libya Pakistan Sudan
Andorra China Guinea Liechtenstein Palau Suriname
Angola Colombia Guinea-Bissau Lithuania Palestinian Swaziland
Antigua and Barbuda Comoros Guyana Luxembourg Panama Sweden
Argentina Congo Haiti Macao SAR Papua New Guinea Switzerland
Armenia Congo (DR) Holy See Macedonia Paraguay Syria
Australia Costa Rica Honduras Madagascar Peru Taiwan
Austria Cote d’Ivoire Hong Kong SAR Malawi Philippines Tajikistan
Azerbaijan Croatia Hungary Malaysia Poland Tanzania
Bahamas Cuba Iceland Maldives Portugal Thailand
Bahrain Cyprus India Mali Qatar Timor-Leste
Bangladesh Czech Republic Indonesia Malta Romania Togo
Barbados Denmark Iran Marshall Islands Russia Tonga
Belarus Djibouti Iraq Mauritania Rwanda Trinidad and Tobago
Belgium Dominica Ireland Mauritius Saint Kitts and Nevis Tunisia
Belize Dominican Republic Israel Mexico Saint Lucia Turkey
Benin Ecuador Italy Micronesia Saint Vincent Turkmenistan
Bhutan Egypt Jamaica Moldova Samoa Tuvalu
Bolivia El Salvador Japan Monaco San Marino Uganda
Bosnia and Herzegovina Equatorial Guinea Jordan Mongolia Sao Tome and Principe Ukraine
Botswana Eritrea Kazakhstan Montenegro Saudi Arabia UAE
Brazil Estonia Kenya Morocco Senegal UK
Brunei Darussalam Ethiopia Kiribati Mozambique Serbia USA
Bulgaria Fiji Korea (North) Namibia Seychelles Uruguay
Burkina Faso Finland Korea (South) Nauru Sierra Leone Uzbekistan
Burma France Kosovo Nepal Singapore Vanuatu
Burundi Gabon Kuwait Netherlands Slovakia Venezuela
Cambodia Gambia Kyrgyzstan New Zealand Slovenia Vietnam
Cameroon Georgia Laos Nicaragua Solomon Islands Yemen
Canada Germany Latvia Niger Somalia Zambia
Cape Verde Ghana Lebanon Nigeria South Africa Zimbabwe
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